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ABSTRACT
A key function of trial courts is their gatekeeping responsibility, by
which they advance the truth-seeking function of the trial process. This
Article makes the rather unremarkable argument that a "reliability para-
digm" undergirds almost every rule in the Federal Rules of Evidence
(FRE). For most rules, the evidentiary foundation required for admitting
evidence ensures the reliability of the evidence. Courts effectively conduct
gatekeeping merely by applying the rules such as the hearsay exceptions in
FRE 803 and 804. For other rules, the reliability paradigm has informed
the interpretation of the rules, as was the case for FRE 702 in Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. A general thesis of this Article is that it
is especially appropriate for courts in criminal trials to engage in gatekeep-
ing for evidence fraught with reliability issues because it is highly prone to
misleading the jury and causing a wrongful criminal conviction.
This Article applies the holistic interpretation of the rules of evidence
seen in Daubert to eyewitness identification, the leading cause of wrongful
convictions. This analysis illustrates the manner in which courts should
apply evidentiary reliability gatekeeping to eyewitness identifications. Nu-
merous scientific studies and overturned convictions show that traditional
trial protections such as the right to counsel and cross-examination do not
suffice to prevent wrongful convictions. Jurors do not possess the special-
ized knowledge necessary to evaluate the reliability of eyewitness identifica-
tions properly, nor is it feasible for them to obtain this knowledge during
trial. Unfortunately for the wrongly accused, identification testimony has
traditionally received a free pass under the rules of evidence, and the Su-
preme Court has recently reaffirmed that due process does not provide
meaningful reliability screening (ironically, citing the "protective rules of
evidence" as one of the sources of regulation).
This Article examines a pair of recent New Jersey cases that attempt to
provide more effective screening for eyewitness identification. While the
cases do advocate the use of best practices by law enforcement in obtaining
eyewitness identifications, the Article contends that the rulings impose sub-
stantive and procedural limitations that will make the new gatekeeping re-
gime largely ineffective. The immediacy of the erroneous identification
challenge demands assertive judicial oversight. In the absence of legislative
reform, trial courts can abate the leading cause of wrongful convictions
only by fully embracing the gatekeeping role provided under the rules of
evidence. Daubert teaches that judicial initiative can start the rule revision
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process that encourages the Advisory Committee to make appropriate
amendments. The last section of the Article makes some preliminary sug-
gestions for amendments to the FRE (and state counterparts) that would
substantially elucidate the gatekeeping process necessary to prevent wrong-
ful convictions caused by misidentification.
"These rules shall be construed so as to administer every proceeding
fairly . . . and promote the development of evidence law, to the end of
ascertaining the truth and securing a just determination. "-Federal Rules
of Evidence Rule 102 Purpose.
I. INTRODUCTION
OES the law of evidence require courts to exclude unreliable
evidence? Oddly enough, this basic question of evidence law has
no simple answer. In some circumstances, the federal rules have
been interpreted to require a "gatekeeping" assessment of reliability by
the trial court as a condition precedent to admissibility, such as with sci-
entific expert testimony under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc.' On the other hand, several other rules contain elements considered
guarantees of trustworthiness that must be proved by the proponent. The
hearsay rules generally operate this way.2 Ostensibly, they exclude hear-
say on reliability grounds, but then make numerous exceptions for hear-
say that by their nature possess indicia of reliability. 3 In effect, when a
proponent proves the elements of a hearsay exception, this also estab-
lishes the trustworthiness of the statement.
However, not all hearsay exceptions turn on reliability. Federal Rule
of Evidence (Rule) 801(c), for example, designates certain hearsay state-
ments as "not hearsay," freely admitting such statements without regard
to trustworthiness. 4 Traditionally, eyewitness identification evidence has
received this "not hearsay" treatment.5
1. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 587-89 (1993) (holding that
FRE 702 did not incorporate a "general acceptance" test as a basis for assessing admissibil-
ity of scientific expert testimony, but rather 702 required courts to assess reliability of the
evidence); see also Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147-49 (1999) (holding
that the Daubert standard also applies to technical expert testimony and other expert testi-
mony based on specialized knowledge).
2. FED. R. EvIu. 803 advisory committee's note ("The present rule proceeds upon
the theory that under appropriate circumstances a hearsay statement may possess circum-
stantial guarantees of trustworthiness sufficient to justify nonproduction of the declarant in
person at the trial even though he may be available.").
3. The rules define hearsay as a statement, other than one made by the declarant
while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter
asserted. FED. R. EVID. 801(c). For examples of hearsay exceptions based on reliability
considerations, see FED. R. EVID. 803, 804. See also infra notes 69-74 and accompanying
text.
4. FED. R. EVID. 801(d); see also Sam Stonefield, Rule 801(d)'s Oxymoronic "Not
Hearsay" Classification: The Untold Backstory and a Suggested Amendment, 5 FED. CTs. L.
REV. 1, 2 (2011).
5. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(C).
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Eyewitness testimony involves the admission of out-of-court state-
ments that would normally be considered hearsay, but Rule 801 artifi-
cially reclassifies them as "not hearsay."'6 In criminal cases, this has
meant that trial courts admit eyewitness identifications-a critical type of
prosecution evidence-without screening them for reliability under the
rules of evidence. 7 While other hearsay exceptions require proponents to
prove that the statements possess characteristics indicative of trustworthi-
ness, Rule 801 instead makes identification evidence categorically admis-
sible on the sole condition that the eyewitness testifies and is subject to
cross-examination. 8 Now that the steady stream of DNA exonerations
has shown eyewitness identification evidence to be a leading cause of
wrongful convictions, 9 the traditional admission of this error-prone evi-
dence without judicial oversight for reliability can no longer be tolerated.
The principal role of the rules of evidence is to safeguard the search for
truth by ensuring the reliability of evidence.10 This reliability paradigm
underlies virtually every evidentiary rule and advances the main objective
of the rules. To those ends, most of the rules require some form of relia-
bility gatekeeping by the trial court as a condition precedent to the ad-
missibility of evidence. A review of the Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE)
shows that each evidence rule can be categorized under one of five cate-
gories corresponding to its purpose."1 By far, the largest category of rules
consists of those advancing the reliability of the trial process. 12 In some
cases, the court's gatekeeping role is weak, but in most cases it is strong,
depending on the extent to which reliability coincides with credibility.
When reliability turns largely on a finding of witness credibility, the jury
plays a greater role in deciding reliability.13
6. Id.
7. The Supreme Court outlined a due process test ostensibly based on reliability in
Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114-16 (1977). This test is based on scientifically incor-
rect and incomplete factors, and it does not properly screen identification evidence for
reliability. See infra notes 168-75 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 266-75 and accompanying text.
9. The Innocence Project of the Cardozo School of Law reports a total of 289 post-
conviction DNA exonerations in United States history. See Innocence Project Case
Profiles, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/know/ (last visited May 19,
2012). Five additional cases involve non-DNA exonerations. See Non-DNA Exonerations,
INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/know/non-dna-exonerations.php
(last visited May 19, 2012). See generally BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNO-
CENT: WHERE CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONs Go WRONG (2011) (addressing a study of the first
250 DNA exoneration cases).
The number of wrongfully convicted persons whose cases do not include DNA evidence
most likely exceeds the DNA cases many times over, but those cases are much harder to
prove. By some estimates, the actual number of people wrongly convicted of felonies each
year may be in the thousands. See Richard A. Wise, Clifford S. Fishman & Martin A.
Safer, How to Analyze the Accuracy of Eyewitness Testimony in a Criminal Case, 42 CONN.
L. REV. 435, 440 (2009); Samuel R. Gross et al., Exonerations in the United States 1989
Through 2003, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 523, 523-24 (2005).
10. See Appendix; see also infra Section II.A.
11. See Appendix; see also infra notes 48-52 and accompanying text.
12. Id.
13. See infra notes 114-15 and accompanying text.
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Using eyewitness identification testimony as an illustration, this Article
argues that unless a rule fits within one of the narrowly circumscribed
areas of departure from the reliability paradigm, courts should construe
evidentiary rules in a manner that promotes trial outcome reliability. The
stated purpose of the rules of evidence is to guide courts in furthering the
development of evidence case law so as to maximize the accuracy of trial
verdicts. 14 The reliability paradigm is even reflected in the procedural
rules that leave most evidentiary gatekeeping to trial judges.1 5 The usual
practice of tasking the jury with evaluating eyewitness identification rep-
resents a failure of courts to exercise their proper gatekeeping role, 16 es-
pecially because eyewitness identification evidence is critical prosecution
evidence, and jurors are not equipped to evaluate it properly. 17
The DNA exonerations have led scholars of wrongful convictions, as
well as reform groups, to call for "pretrial reliability hearings" for eyewit-
ness identifications and other leading causes of wrongful convictions,
such as confessions and informant testimony.1 8 Such hearings would re-
14. See infra notes 47-55 and accompanying text (discussing FRE 102 and construing
rules to promote the growth and development of the law of evidence).
15. See infra notes 116-24 and accompanying text.
16. In addition to the evidentiary gatekeeping role played by trial judges, judges also
have the responsibility to ensure the fairness of trial proceedings as a matter of judicial
ethics and in their supervisory role over the administration of justice. See Sandra Guerra
Thompson, Eyewitness Identifications and State Courts as Guardians Against Wrongful
Conviction, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 603, 632 n.180 (2010) [hereinafter Eyewitness Identifica-
tions]; Mary Sue Backus, The Adversary System Is Dead; Long Live the Adversary System:
The Trial Judge as the Great Equalizer in Criminal Trials, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REv. 945,
961-70. Some judges have also invoked their supervisory authority to ensure the fairness
of the adversary system. See Thompson, Eyewitness Identifications, supra, at 622.
17. See infra notes 253-59 and accompanying text on juror assessments of reliability.
18. See RICHARD A. LEO, POLICE INTERROGATION AND AMERICAN JUSTICE 289-91
(2008) (recommending pretrial reliability hearings for confessions); ALEXANDRA
NATAPOFF, SNITCHING: CRIMINAL INFORMANTS AND THE EROSION OF AMERICAN JUSTICE
194-95 (2009) (recommending pretrial reliability hearings for informant testimony); San-
dra Guerra Thompson, Judicial Gatekeeping of Police-Generated Witness Testimony, 102 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 1-2) (on file with Soc. Sci.
Res. Network Elec. Paper Collection) [hereinafter Judicial Gatekeeping] (recommending
pretrial reliability hearings for eyewitness identifications, confessions, and government in-
formant testimony). See generally Keith A. Findley, Innocents at Risk: Adversary Imbal-
ance, Forensic Science, and the Search for Truth, 38 SETON HALL L. REV. 893, 911 (2008)
(arguing that rules of evidence already incorporate some forms of gatekeeping for reliabil-
ity). Reform groups such as the Innocence Project and the now-defunct Justice Project
have also called for pretrial reliability hearings. See State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872,
915-16 (N.J. 2011) (addressing Innocence Project recommendations regarding reliability
hearings for eyewitness identifications); THE JUSTICE PROJECT, ELECTRONIC RECORDING
OF CUSTODIAL INTERROGATIONS: A POLICY REVIEW 2-4 (2007) (on file with author) (call-
ing for pretrial reliability hearings for confessions); THE JUSTICE PROJECT, JAILHOUSE
SNITCH TESTIMONY: A POLICY REVIEW 3-4 (2007) (on file with author) (calling for pretrial
reliability hearings for informant testimony). The state of Illinois has adopted a statute
that requires pretrial reliability hearings for government informant testimony in capital
cases and provides seven factors for courts to consider in determining reliability. See
NATAPOFF, supra, at 194. In the past I have also argued in favor of a corroborating evi-
dence rule to better ensure the reliability of eyewitness identification, see Sandra Guerra
Thompson, Beyond a Reasonable Doubt? Reconsidering Uncorroborated Eyewitness Iden-
tification Testimony, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1487, 1497 (2008) [hereinafter Beyond a Rea-
sonable Doubt?], as well as greater judicial oversight under state constitutional law, state
2012]
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semble the type contemplated in the Supreme Court's landmark decisions
on scientific and technical evidence-Daubert and Kumho Tire Co. v.
Carmichael.'9 This Article treats the wrongful convictions literature and
reform proposals as a starting point for a discussion about the proper
application of the FRE, the lessons of Daubert, and the role of judges as
evidentiary gatekeepers.
Nothing can be more unfair than a criminal trial dominated by prosecu-
tion evidence that experience and scientific studies have shown to be both
frequently unreliable and difficult for jurors to evaluate for reliability. It
is especially offensive when the unreliability derives primarily from the
conduct of government officials in gathering the evidence, as is often the
case.20 Under these circumstances, the trial court's gatekeeping role is
most compelling. Yet due to the free pass given to identification evidence
under the traditional reading of the hearsay rules, courts have neglected
to conduct reliability screening for this critical prosecution evidence. The
only screening has been to apply the flawed and toothless due process
test of Manson v. Brathwaite.21
The growing awareness of the failures of due process screening under
Manson has led some state courts to tweak the Manson test for purposes
of state constitutional law, but these efforts still fall short of broad relia-
bility gatekeeping.2 2 Recently, the New Jersey Supreme Court in State v.
Henderson rejected the Manson test in favor of farther-reaching reliabil-
ity assessment for identification evidence that the defendant alleges is
tainted by police suggestion.23 Then, in State v. Chen, the court extended
this broad reliability gatekeeping under the state's rules of evidence for
cases not involving police suggestion, but rather private actor sugges-
tion.2 4 Unfortunately, for a variety of reasons, Henderson and Chen fail
to fully embrace the gatekeeping role of a trial court.2 5
rules of evidence, and the courts' supervisory powers. See Thompson, Eyewitness Identifi-
cations, supra note 16, at 607, 622.
19. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590 (1993); Kumho Tire Co. v.
Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 137 (1999); see also Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136,
138-39 (1997) (applying abuse of discretion standard of appellate review to Daubert
rulings).
20. See Thompson, Judicial Gatekeeping, supra note 18, at 3 (addressing the coercive
or suggestive tactics that police officers sometimes use to obtain eyewitness identifications,
confessions, and informant testimony).
21. See 432 U.S. 98, 110 (1977) (holding that due process does not require exclusion of
unnecessarily suggestive identification evidence unless it is unreliable under a five-factored
"totality of circumstances" test); see also infra notes 169-76 and accompanying text.
22. See Thompson, Eyewitness Identifications, supra note 16, at 623-26.
23. State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 919-26 (N.J. 2011) (holding that state due pro-
cess requires pretrial reliability hearings for identifications tainted by police suggestive-
ness); see also infra notes 169-73 and accompanying text.
24. State v. Chen, 27 A.3d 930, 937 (N.J. 2011) (holding that identification tainted by
highly suggestive circumstances caused by a private actor entitles defendant to a pretrial
reliability hearing under the rules of evidence); see also infra notes 194-98 and accompany-
ing text.
25. See infra notes 210-16 and accompanying text.
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As this Article shows, the rules of evidence give courts a clear mandate
to ensure the integrity of the trial as a truth-seeking mechanism by evalu-
ating evidentiary reliability as a condition precedent to admission for
most forms of evidence. The gatekeeping role allows courts the options
of admission and exclusion, but conducting such hearings before trial also
offers the advantage of a more considered use of intermediate palliatives
such as jury instructions26 and expert testimony. Moreover, effective ju-
dicial gatekeeping would necessitate an explicit finding announced in
open court that certain police practices render evidence unreliable, creat-
ing an incentive for the police to follow best practices.27 Appellate courts
would then play an important role in overseeing the gatekeeping pro-
cess.28 Thus, pretrial gatekeeping for reliability has the potential to bring
about important systemic changes and to encourage a sophisticated juris-
prudence on the science and law of eyewitness identifications. In this
sense, Henderson and Chen represent an important leap forward in
clearly articulating the evidentiary need for gatekeeping and the scientifi-
cally-based factors courts should consider.
The Article urges trial courts to reconsider the manner in which they
apply the rules governing the admissibility of eyewitness identification
testimony. As currently written, a faithful reading of the rules is consis-
tent with the reliability paradigm of the FRE to better protect against the
possibility of wrongful conviction. Such a refined interpretation of the
rules would address a pressing need and is likely to spur rule reform, as
was the case in Daubert and its progeny.29 Ideally the rules of evidence
would be revised to make reliability gatekeeping for identification evi-
dence explicit and to define detailed criteria for evaluating this critical
evidence.
Part II of the Article addresses the reliability paradigm in evidence law
and the role of trial courts in conducting reliability gatekeeping. First, it
defines the concept of reliability as the operative principle that underlies
virtually all the substantive rules of evidence. By closely examining the
five categories of evidence rules, one can better appreciate the dominant
role that reliability plays in defining most of the evidentiary rules. This
Part distinguishes the concept of evidentiary reliability, which the court
26. Jury instructions on eyewitness identifications can be given before the witness tes-
tifies, which may be preferable to giving them at the end of the trial. See infra note 215 and
accompanying text.
27. Of course, judicial gatekeeping is not possible without proper documentation of
the interactions between investigators and witnesses, preferably by videotape recording.
Pretrial defense discovery of the videotapes and other documents relating to the testimo-
nial evidence is also necessary. See Thompson, Judicial Gatekeeping, supra note 18, at 58.
In the case of jailhouse informants, commentators have called for courts to impose an
affirmative duty on prosecutors to obtain information on the informant's criminal back-
ground and history as a witness in other cases, so as to disclose all the pertinent informa-
tion to the defense before trial. NATAPOFF, supra note 18, at 192-94.
28. For an article calling for heightened reliability review at the appellate level, see
Keith A. Findley, Innocence Protection in the Appellate Process, 93 MARO. L. Rav. 591,
592 (2009).
29. See infra notes 150-52 and accompanying text.
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should evaluate in the first instance, from the concept of witness credibil-
ity, which only the jury should assess.
In addition, Part II demonstrates that the rules of evidence include pro-
cedural rules that clearly call for judicial gatekeeping for evidentiary reli-
ability. This part concludes with a closer examination of the Supreme
Court's opinion in Daubert, which teaches important lessons on the cen-
trality of reliability and the proper application of Rule 403 to evidentiary
gatekeeping.
In Part III, this Article examines recent decisions of the New Jersey
Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court in the area of eye-
witness identification. It evaluates the pair of recent New Jersey deci-
sions that make great strides in requiring the consideration of well-
established social science research on identification reliability. At the
same time, Part III points out the shortcomings in these decisions. In
Henderson v. New Jersey, for example, the court sets the expectation that
reliability gatekeeping will not affect the admissibility of identification ev-
idence but will merely result in greater use of jury instructions. 30 In Chen
v. New Jersey, the court misapplies the rules of evidence, resulting in er-
roneously placing the burden to prove inadmissibility on the defense. 31
On the federal level, the Supreme Court broke little new ground in Perry
v. New Hampshire, which, like Henderson, refused to extend the scope of
due process protection to cases not involving police suggestion. 32 Unreli-
able identifications, if caused by factors other than improper police sug-
gestion, warrant no due process screening under either Henderson33 or
Perry.34 Interestingly, Perry points to the rules of evidence as the proper
vehicle for litigating claims of unreliability.35
Part IV provides an example of how judges might best carry out their
gatekeeping function as applied to eyewitness identifications. This dis-
cussion reveals a gaping hole in the rules of evidence-that this type of
evidence is freely admitted despite the fact that, in some cases, eyewitness
identifications have substantial indicia of unreliability, especially since
they tend to be procured improperly. Amending the rules to require
courts to perform effective reliability screening for identification evi-
dence would make explicit the courts' gatekeeping responsibility and en-
courage the development of detailed criteria for reliability assessments,
which would also enable meaningful appellate review. 36
30. 27 A.3d 872, 925-26 (N.J. 2011).
31. 27 A.3d 930, 942 (N.J. 2011).
32. 132 S. Ct. 716, 718 (2012).
33. Henderson, 27 A.3d at 877.
34. Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 718.
35. Id. at 719-20.
36. See generally Findley, supra note 18, at 893.
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II. RELIABILITY AND THE JUDICIAL
GATEKEEPING FUNCTION
A criminal trial provides a forum to determine the guilt or innocence of
persons accused of crimes by the government. Each participant in this
public spectacle plays an important role. The truth-seeking mission of the
trial process provides a key role for the community through the jury sys-
tem.37 The Constitution gives the accused a right to a jury of the ac-
cused's peers. The jury system serves as a protection for individuals
against the possibility of misuse of prosecutorial powers to oppress politi-
cal dissidents.38 Thus, community members who serve on juries do so as
a means of protecting defendants who stand accused by the
government.39
Consistent with this vision of the jury trial, a variety of rules govern the
way in which trials are conducted. Constitutional rules, rules of criminal
procedure, and the rules of evidence apply simultaneously and often in
overlapping ways. The following sections focus on the key role played by
the rules of evidence in defining the respective responsibilities of the
judge and the jury in the trial process. While the jury's role may be to
guard defendants against government overreaching, the rules of evidence
recognize that trial courts must protect criminal defendants from jury er-
ror. Many rules of evidence call upon courts to prevent jurors from hear-
ing evidence when it is both (1) highly persuasive to jurors who assign it
great probative weight and (2) a type that jurors are generally unable to
evaluate accurately for reliability.40 Thus, especially in criminal cases,
trial judges play a key role in ensuring the accuracy of a trial by enforcing
37. The Sixth Amendment provides: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining wit-
nesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defen[s]e." U.S. CONST.
amend. VI. See generally JAMES OLDHAM, TRIAL BY JURY: THE SEVENTH AMENDMENT
AND ANGLO-AMERICAN SPECIAL JURIES 25-44 (2006) (discussing the fact-finding role of
the jury and the role of the judge to determine questions of law).
38. As the Supreme Court noted in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 477 (2000),
the jury system "'guard[s] against a spirit of oppression and tyranny on the part of rulers,'
and acts 'as the great bulwark of [our] civil and political liberties."' According to 2 J.
STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 540-41 (4th ed.
1873), trial by jury has been understood to require that "the truth of every accusation,
whether preferred in the shape of indictment, information, or appeal, should afterwards be
confirmed by the unanimous suffrage of twelve of [the defendant's] equals and neighbours
.... " (quoting 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 343 (1769)
(emphasis added)). See generally JOHN GuINTHER, THE JURY IN AMERICA at xiii (1988)
("Thomas Jefferson and others have seen [the jury] as the public's line of defense against
the state when it acts oppressively, and Jefferson, for that reason, once declared that the
right to a trial by jury was more precious to the maintenance of a democracy than even the
right to vote.").
39. The Sixth Amendment gives the accused the right to have a jury determine the
elements of the crime, including any fact that increases the maximum punishment. Ap-
prendi, 530 U.S. at 490; see also OLDHAM, supra note 37, at 39-40.
40. See, e.g., infra notes 75-81 (addressing character evidence rules), 57-62 (address-
ing FRE 403), and 138-44 (addressing justification for gatekeeping of scientific evidence).
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the rules of evidence, most of which are designed to further the search for
truth.
A. THE RELIABILITY PARADIGM
An examination of the purposes of the FRE, and of evidentiary rules in
general, must start from the obvious premise that the rules are designed
as a guide for litigants and judges to determine the procedural and sub-
stantive issues regarding the admissibility of various types of evidence.
Litigants invoke the rules during the course of trials, and trial courts enter
their rulings by assessing the evidence in question in relation to the rule
that is invoked.41 Jurors hear testimony and review documents or other
physical evidence that the trial judge admits. Courts frequently guide ju-
rors in how they should assess the evidence by providing "limiting in-
structions" or other jury instructions.42 The rules do not task jurors with
determining the admissibility of evidence as such.43 Moreover, appellate
courts are highly deferential to evidentiary rulings by trial courts.44 Thus,
as between trial judge and jury, the most powerful institutional player in
determining the admissibility of evidence is clearly the trial judge.45 Ju-
rors play a passive role in simply receiving the evidence that judges allow
them to hear and considering it in the manner in which judges instruct.46
In making difficult admissibility determinations, courts have long been
41. Of course, in practice, judges have no freestanding authority to act as "'evidence
police;' . . . the rules govern only to the extent that they are invoked or ignored by trial
lawyers." Daniel D. Blinka, Ethics, Evidence, and the Modern Adversary Trial, 19 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHics 1, 6 (2006). Nonetheless, when a litigant does invoke the rules, the court is
thrust into the role of "evidence police," at least with regard to the particular objection
raised.
42. See generally Overview: Importance of Proper Instructions in Admitting Evidence,
FEDERAL JURY INSTRUCTIONs RESOURCE PAGE, http://federalevidence.com/node/893 (last
visited May 19, 2012).
43. Federal Rule of Evidence 104(a) instructs courts to "decide any preliminary ques-
tion about whether ... evidence is admissible." Ostensibly, Rule 104(b) reserves a minor
role for the jury to determine the admissibility of conditionally relevant evidence. The
Advisory Committee's notes reflect a concern that questions of conditional relevance
should be decided by the jury lest the "functioning of the jury as a trier of fact ... be
greatly restricted and in some cases virtually destroyed." However, scholars have criticized
the rule as erroneous and viewed it instead as a rule that justifies a court in excluding
evidence that is not supported by an adequate foundation. FED. R. EVID. 104. See Dale A.
Nance, Conditional Relevance Reinterpreted, 70 B.U. L. REv. 447, 448, 489-505 (1990) (ar-
guing that the conditional relevance rule finds support in a "best evidence principle" and
rejecting the United States Supreme Court's opinion in Huddleston v. United States, 485
U.S. 681 (1988), as poorly decided in failing to give adequate justification for the decision
to admit evidence of prior crimes).
44. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 143 (1997) (applying abuse of discretion
standard of appellate review to Daubert rulings).
45. For a discussion of the legitimacy and value of judges exercising discretion in the
application of the FRE, see David P. Leonard, Power and Responsibility in Evidence Law,
63 S. CAL. L. REv. 937, 967 (1990) (demonstrating that the rules reflect the drafters' choice
to create "flexible standards [that] would more effectively fulfill the Rules' core principles
than a system of fixed rules with many exclusionary provisions").
46. See supra note 43.
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guided by the underlying purposes of the rule of evidence at issue. 47
Courts also take a broader view of the overriding concerns that motivate
the entire body of rules, as well as the judge's principal function in ruling
on evidence. 48 The FRE can be sorted under five main rubrics: (1) rules
advancing societal interests other than the search for truth; (2) procedural
rules for applying the evidence rules; (3) rules reflecting notions of fair-
ness in the advocacy system; (4) rules ensuring the reliability of the trial
process; and (5) rules serving the goal of judicial efficiency.49 Of the five
categories, the rules ensuring evidentiary reliability represent the largest
category.50 In fact, almost all of the Rules of Evidence can be seen as
requiring courts to screen evidence so that the jury considers only suffi-
ciently reliable evidence.51 This should not surprise us since the objec-
tives of the rules are to ascertain the truth and produce just
determinations. 52
The following sections explore the concept of evidentiary reliability, as
contrasted with witness credibility, and further define each of the five
types of evidentiary rules. By providing a closer look at the overwhelm-
ing number of rules designed to promote verdict accuracy, this Section
demonstrates the primacy of reliability as the overriding purpose of the
rules of evidence. The procedural rules, as well as evidence jurispru-
dence, make clear that trial courts play an important role in evaluating
evidentiary reliability, leaving it to the jury to assign weights to the evi-
dence and to perform the related task of judging witnesses' credibility. In
most cases, courts evaluate reliability simply by determining admissibility
47. For an essay arguing that the Rules drafters sought to leave sufficient flexibility for
courts to address unforeseen situations, see Eileen A. Scallen, Interpreting the Federal
Rules of Evidence: The Use and Abuse of the Advisory Committee Notes, 28 Loy. L.A. L.
REV. 1283, 1283 (1995).
48. See infra notes 145-49 and accompanying text.
49. See Appendix.
50. See Appendix (showing that 59 of the 68 Federal Rules promote reliability of the
trial process, as compared to the next largest category, the procedural rules, representing
15 of the 68 Rules of Evidence). Of course, the total number of rules does not necessarily
correspond with the volume of evidence admitted or excluded under any particular type of
rule, but it does reflect the drafters' overriding concern to safeguard the integrity of the
trial process.
51. David S. Schwartz makes a similar argument in a recent article in reference to
rules he considers foundational or "implicit" in the "underlying structure," such as Rules
602, 701, and 901, as well as 104(b). See David S. Schwartz, A Foundation Theory of Evi-
dence, 100 GEO. L.J. 95, 100 (2011). He refers to the underlying theory of evidence as
"foundation," by which he means that proponents must show that the evidence makes "a
case-specific assertion of fact that must be probably true in order to lend support to a legal
claim." Id. at 98 (emphasis added). Thus, he writes: "The existing rules of foundation,
with their 'evidence sufficient to support a finding' standard, ask the judge to screen offers
of evidence to make sure they are believable by a rational jury. Such evidence must be
specifically assertive and probably true; without those characteristics, evidence cannot be
logically relevant." Id. at 171. The reliability of evidence is to be contrasted with the credi-
bility of evidence. The jury's central function is to evaluate the credibility of each side's
evidence. The ultimate question of the weight of each side's evidence will depend on the
jury's assessment of the credibility of the witnesses. See infra notes 90-110 and accompany-
ing text.
52. See FED. R. EVID. 102.
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under various rules, such as the hearsay exceptions in Rules 803 and
804.53 In other cases, the court's gatekeeping discretion may be fairly
weak.54 Nonetheless, it is fair to say that courts possess a gatekeeping
function for virtually all evidence.55
1. Reliability Defined
As used in this Article, "reliability" refers to the nature of the evidence
in furthering the objectives of the FRE to ascertain truth. In other words,
reliability means accuracy, and evidentiary reliability promotes accuracy
in the outcome of the trial process. The most obvious type of evidentiary
reliability involves the admission of evidence that provides accurate infor-
mation. Thus, for example, scientific evidence that is found to be "relia-
ble"-the term chosen by the Supreme Court in Daubert-derives from
an accurate foundation of scientific data upon which courts can rely to
increase the likelihood of reaching a trial verdict that reflects the truth.5 6
"Scientific" evidence found unreliable is thus excluded because the con-
clusions drawn from it are likely to be wrong.
Rule 403 and other, similar rules regulate reliability in a second, less
obvious way by empowering courts to exclude evidence that has a ten-
dency to distort the trial process because of its potential effect on the
jury.57 The Rule allows judges to exclude evidence on the ground that its
"probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of . . .unfair
prejudice, confusing the issues, [or] . ..misleading the jury, '58 among
other considerations.59 The term "probative value" here refers to its
53. FED. R. EVID. 803, 804.
54. See infra note 75 and accompanying text.
55. Arguably, Rule 801(d)(2) allows admissions of a party opponent without regard to
unreliability; however, the declarant's presence in court as a party opponent provides some
assurance that any unreliability of the statements can be brought to light. See FED. R.
EVID. 801(d)(2). Thus, even this rule contemplates some assurance of reliability.
56. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589-90 (1993); see also infra
notes 138-43 and accompanying text. I recognize that the terms "reliable" and "accurate"
(or "valid") are not used interchangeably in science, as they are in law. See Simon A. Cole,
Forensic Science and Wrongful Convictions: From Exposer to Contributor to Corrector, 46
NEW EM. L. REV. 711 (2012). The interpretation of "reliability" in this Article speaks only
to the reliability (in the sense of apparent accuracy based on the best available analysis) of
a critical and persuasive item of evidence. When the circumstances show an identification
was obtained under highly "unreliable" conditions, this evidence presents an inordinate
risk of wrongful conviction, especially in the absence of other strong identification evi-
dence. Given that the burden of proof in criminal cases reflects a strong systemic prefer-
ence to avoid wrongful convictions (as opposed to wrongful acquittals), it is appropriate to
interpret the objectives stated in Rule 102 to "ascertain[ ] the truth and secur[e] a just
determination" as also reflecting this same strong preference to avoid wrongful convic-
tions. See FED. R. EVID. 102.
57. See FED. R. EvID. 403; see generally Victor J. Gold, Federal Rule of Evidence 403:
Observations on the Nature of Unfairly Prejudicial Evidence, 58 WASH. L. REv. 497, 503
(1983) (observing that Rule 403 gives courts the discretion to exclude evidence when "it
has a tendency to cause the trier of fact to commit inferential error"); see also FED. R.
EVID. 404-12.
58. FED. R. EVID. 403.
59. Rule 403 also lists other grounds for exclusion, including "undue delay, wasting
time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence." Id.
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value or weight as proof in a party's case. 60 Credible witness testimony
on critical aspects of a party's case will have great probative value, with-
out which a party may not be able to present a full picture of the events in
question. Allowing both parties to admit as much probative evidence as
they deem necessary promotes the advocacy system's goal of seeking the
truth.
Yet not all witness testimony is admissible. When probative evidence
also has an inordinate tendency to inflame the passions or prejudices of
the jury or to confuse or mislead them, the rules give trial courts the dis-
cretion to exclude or limit such evidence. 61 Emotional reactions and con-
fusion on important issues will distort a jury's ability to make rational,
well-informed judgments. Emotions such as fear, revulsion, or disdain
will lead jurors to assign more or less weight (or probative value) to cer-
tain evidence than it in fact deserves, thus distorting the truth-seeking
process. 62 Excluding evidence that is substantially more "unfairly preju-
dicial" than it is probative will eliminate substantial distortions that could
skew the jury's decisionmaking and lead to an inaccurate verdict. Simi-
larly, the Rules exclude evidence that is unfairly misleading because ju-
rors lack the ability to 'evaluate it properly. Thus, Rule 403 empowers
judges to exclude evidence not because it is likely wrong, but because the
risk posed by the jury's inability to properly evaluate the evidence in-
creases the chance of an inaccurate verdict.
2. Promoting the Reliability of Trial. Verdicts
Most of the Federal Rules of Evidence call for the exclusion of evi-
dence on reliability grounds to prevent inaccurate verdicts. As shown in
the Appendix, many rules serve multiple purposes at once, but almost all
of the rules regulate evidence at least partly on reliability grounds.63 The
best evidence rule, for example, requires production of the original or a
duplicate of any non-collateral writing, recording, or photograph if it is
available. 64 The rule expresses a preference for the production of the
document or recording over live testimony, which may be unreliable. 65
60. See Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 180-85 (1997) (addressing the pro-
cess for evaluating probative value, which is done by comparing the evidence to other
relevant evidence available to prove the same matter).
61. Id. at 180-81 (addressing judicial authority to exclude evidence under Rule 403).
62. See Gold, supra note 57, at 506.
63. One may quibble with one or another purpose assigned to a particular rule. The
study is not intended as a scientific empirical exercise but rather as a rough guide or visual
aid. The sheer volume of rules designed to serve reliability purposes is beyond question,
even if one can dispute a particular categorization.
64. See FED. R. EvID. 1002, 1001, 1004(d). The rule allows for exceptions when items
are lost or destroyed through no fault of the proponent, among others. See, e.g., FED. R.
EvIo. 1004(a)-(c).
65. The Advisory Committee's notes to Rule 1003, for example, explain that dupli-
cates "serve[ J equally as well as the original" in situations "[w]hen the only concern is with
getting the words and other contents before the court with accuracy and precision." FED.
R. EvID. 1003 Advisory Committee's notes. By implication, oral testimony of witnesses
would not provide the same accuracy and precision as documents or recordings. As a rule
of preference, the best evidence rule does not necessarily call for oral testimony to be
2012]
SMU LAW REVIEW
Other rules that require courts to conduct gatekeeping to advance the
interest of evidentiary reliability include the rules on witness qualifica-
tion,66 the rules on expert witness testimony,67 and the rules for authenti-
cating evidence, 68 to name a few.
The FRE state a categorical exclusion of hearsay statements due to the
inability to test either the reliability or the credibility of the out-of-court
"declarant" who made the statement.69 The Rules reflect a preference
excluded on reliability grounds, but it insists that the most reliable form of evidence availa-
ble be admitted. The rule serves the dual purpose of advancing the fairness of the advo-
cacy system by excluding oral testimony when the more reliable forms of the evidence
were lost or destroyed in bad faith. See FED. R. EvID. 1004(a).
66. Rule 601 requires that witnesses be competent to testify, and Rule 603 requires
that they take an oath or affirm that they will testify truthfully. Each of these requirements
furthers the reliability of the trial process in obvious ways. See FED. R. EVID. 601, 603.
67. See FED. R. EvID. 702-05; see also infra Section II.C.
68. Rules 901 and 902 govern the authentication of evidence. FED. R. EVID. 901, 902.
Interestingly, here is an area where the admissibility of evidence is ultimately decided by
the jury. Rule 104(a) leaves to courts the task of determining the admissibility of evidence
as a general matter. However, Rule 104(b) provides that "[w]hen the relevance of evi-
dence depends on whether a fact exists, proof must be introduced sufficient to support a
finding that the fact does exist." FED. R. EvID. 104(b). Courts have determined that, with
regard to proving the authenticity of evidence, the evidence is not relevant unless there is
evidence sufficient to support a finding that the evidence is authentic. For example, merely
testifying that a white powder is cocaine is insufficient to prove that the substance intro-
duced at trial is actually cocaine. Additional evidence must be proffered to establish the
reliability of any finding that the substance is cocaine. If a chemist testifies that the sub-
stance tested positive for cocaine in reliable scientific testing, then that testimony would be
sufficient-if the chemist is found to be credible by the finder of fact. The decision
whether to credit testimony or other evidence offered on the issue of authenticity is thus
technically left to the jury as a matter of "admissibility." See, e.g., Huddleston v. United
States, 485 U.S. 681, 689-90 (1988) (finding that admissibility of evidence under Rule
404(b) raises a question of conditional relevancy, and the court's role is simply to deter-
mine whether there is sufficient evidence on which the jury can find the evidence relevant
under Rule 104(b)). Even so, however, the trial court plays a role in "admitting" the evi-
dence if there is sufficient evidence to support such a finding by the jury. Id. at 690. In
somewhat elliptical fashion, the Advisory Committee's notes explain the rationale for FRE
104(b):
If preliminary questions of conditional relevancy were determined solely
by the judge, as provided in subdivision (a), the functioning of the jury as a
trier of fact would be greatly restricted and in some cases virtually destroyed.
These are appropriate questions for juries. Accepted treatment, as provided
in the rule, is consistent with that given fact questions generally. The judge
makes a preliminary determination whether the foundation evidence is suffi-
cient to support a finding of fulfillment of the condition. If so, the item is
admitted. If after all the evidence on the issue is in, pro and con, the jury
could reasonably conclude that fulfillment of the condition is not established,
the issue is for them. If the evidence is not such as to allow a finding, the
judge withdraws the matter from their consideration.
FED. R. EVID. 104(b) Advisory Committee's notes (internal citations omitted). Thus, even
in an area in which the jury ostensibly plays a fact-finding role in admitting evidence, the
court in the first instance determines whether there is sufficient evidence to support such a
finding. To do otherwise would allow the jury to consider evidence upon which there is an
insufficient basis supporting authenticity, and that would introduce unreliability.
69. See FED. R. EvID. 801(c) (defining hearsay); 802 (stating that hearsay is not admis-
sible except as provided by the FRE, other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court, or a
federal law). The Advisory Committee's notes to Rule 801(a), which define a "statement"
for purposes of the hearsay rule, note that motivations for the hearsay rule are to exclude
statements that are "untested with respect to the perception, memory, and narration (or
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for live witnesses who give in-court testimony rather than those who
would testify to the out-of-court statements of another. 70 Mueller and
Kirkpatrick's treatise on evidence explains the nature of the risks of unre-
liability inherent in hearsay statements:
At the heart of the hearsay doctrine is the conviction that out-of-
court statements are generally an inferior kind of proof....
One risk is that the speaker may misperceive the condition or
event in question. [There are three concerns regarding the speaker's
observation.]
One centers on the sensory capacities of the speaker.... Another
centers on his mental capacity, which means mostly his judgment and
ability to process and make sense of whatever he sees and hears.
Both concerns are affected by attitudes, expectations, [and] psycho-
logical conditions ... that might bear on opportunity to observe.
Any or all these factors might prove critical, and being wary does not
so much imply a skeptical view of human capabilities as a cautious
attitude toward factfinding.
Another risk is that the speaker might err in calling to mind the
events or conditions he observed. We commonly think of memory as
fading over time....
Psychologists report that recollecting does not involve retrieving a
datum stored in the mind in static condition (as it might rest in com-
puter memory): It is better understood as creating a new mental im-
age that is affected by-indeed partly comprised of-subsequent
memories along with today's impressions and ideas....
Another risk is insincerity, meaning that the speaker might shade
the truth or blatantly falsify. 71
In sum, the rules do not preclude a witness's testimony out of concerns
that the witness is not "credible"-that is, a person who should not be
believed. Rather, it is the absence of the declarant in court that makes
the witness's testimony untrustworthy, because the declarant may be in-
sincere (i.e., not credible), unreliable (due to memory issues), or both.72
The inability to judge a declarant's credibility or reliability makes out-of-
court statements untrustworthy.73 The Advisory Committee provided
numerous exceptions to the rule on the grounds that those types of hear-
their equivalents) of the actor" and to address concerns with the "possibility of
fabrication" and "questions of sincerity" of evidence. FED. R. EVID. 801(a) Advisory
Committee's notes.
70. The general exclusion of hearsay reflects this preference. See FED. R. EVID.
801-04. The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment also forbids the government
from offering the out-of-court "testimonial" statements of witnesses against a defendant.
To admit a witness's testimonial statements, the government must show that the witness is
unavailable and that the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the witness.
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004).
71. MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE § 8.2, at 695-96 (3d ed. 2003). Interest-
ingly, the hearsay risks closely coincide with many of the risks associated with eyewitness
identifications. See infra notes 63-68 and accompanying text.




say "may possess circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, '74 consis-
tent with the reliability rationale for the rule.
The FRE also generally exclude character evidence in criminal cases on
reliability grounds (making special exceptions for sexual assault and child
molestation cases). 75 Character evidence does not accurately indicate a
person's guilt or innocence of a particular offense. As Mueller and Kirk-
patrick explain: "[W]hile a persons' [sic] propensities ["character"] are a
useful gauge of likely behavior patterns over a period of time, they are
less accurate when used to decide what happened on one particular occa-
sion because people do not always act in accordance with their
propensities. 76
Justice Jackson has also pointed out that character evidence can lead to
unreliable verdicts because jurors will have a tendency to assign such evi-
dence more weight than it deserves. 77 Thus, although the character evi-
dence itself may be accurate in the sense of conveying accurate
information relevant to an assessment of the defendant's character, it in-
troduces unreliability because it will not be properly discounted by the
jury. As Justice Jackson writes,
The inquiry [into character] is not rejected because character is irrel-
evant; on the contrary, it is said to weigh too much with the jury and
to so overpersuade them as to prejudge one with a bad general re-
cord and deny him a fair opportunity to defend against a particular
charge... [I]ts disallowance tends to prevent confusion of issues, un-
fair surprise and undue prejudice. 78
The limitations on the use of character evidence thus promote reliabil-
ity in the same manner as Rule 403. 7 9 In an assault case, for example, the
government may not rely on the testimony of witnesses who would testify
to the defendant's violent tendencies to prove that the defendant at-
tacked the victim on the particular occasion in question.8 0 Prosecutors
should instead prove their cases with evidence pertaining specifically to
the event in question. Evidence of a violent character introduces unrelia-
bility due to its potential to anger jurors who might punish the defendant
for being a bad person or for past crimes.8 1 Alternatively, jurors might
exercise less care in ensuring that the government has proved every ele-
ment beyond a reasonable doubt. If the defendant is shown to be a "bad
guy," jurors might lose interest in carefully considering the evidence and
requiring the government to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. In-
74. See FED. R. EViD. 803 Advisory Committee's note.
75. See FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(1) (prohibited uses of character evidence); FED. R. EVID.
413(a) (permitted uses of similar crimes in sexual assault cases); FED. R. EVID. 414(a)
(permitted uses of similar crimes in child-molestation cases).
76. MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 71, § 4.11, at 183-84 (emphasis added).
77. Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475-76 (1948).
78. Id.
79. See supra notes 57-60 and accompanying text.
80. See FED. R. EvID. 404(a).
81. MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 71, § 4.11, at 183.
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nocent defendants with violent histories therefore would be at greater
risk of wrongful conviction.
3. Other Purposes Generally Coincide with Reliability
The rules pursue three other substantive purposes besides reliability:
advancing societal goals outside of the litigation context, promoting judi-
cial efficiency, and promoting fairness within the advocacy system.82 In
almost every instance, these goals operate as coincidental purposes to the
central purpose of verdict reliability. 83 For example, Rule 407 prohibits
evidence of subsequent remedial measures when offered to prove a
party's negligence.8 4 To illustrate the reliability rationale for this rule,
imagine that an automobile driver sues a train company after having a
serious collision with a train. Rule 407 prohibits the plaintiff from offer-
ing evidence of the fact that the railroad implemented safety improve-
ments to the railroad crossing immediately following the accident.8 5 The
rule advances verdict reliability because proof of a subsequent remedial
measure may not be reliable evidence of the defendant's negligence. 86
The defendant is negligent only if a reasonable person operating a rail-
road would have foreseen the particular danger in question. The fact that
the railroad-with the benefit of hindsight-opted to make safety im-
provements does not necessarily mean that the danger was foreseeable
before the accident. Thus, admission of this evidence might mislead the
jury on the question of negligence and contribute to an inaccurate
verdict.
In addition, Rule 407 reflects a coincidental purpose not to deter par-
ties such as business owners from taking remedial measures after acci-
dents and other mishaps for fear of increasing their liability in tort.8 7 The
purpose of not deterring remedial measures advances an important socie-
tal interest in public safety, a goal that lies outside the realm of trial
advocacy.
82. See Appendix. The fifth type of rule is non-substantive. These rules establish
proper procedures or consist only of definitions. They are "rules of evidence" only in
name. These rules include Rule 101 (outlining the application of the rules to federal courts
and providing definitions for a few basic terms such as "civil case"), Rule 1001 (defining
terms pertaining to the best evidence rule), Rule 1008 (explaining functions of court and
jury in applying the "best evidence" rule), Rule 1101 (delineating the applicability of the
rules to certain federal courts and to certain cases and proceedings), Rule 1102 (referenc-
ing statutory authorization for amendments), and Rule 1103 (stating that the rules may be
cited as the Federal Rules of Evidence).
83. See Appendix.
84. FED. R. EvID. 407. The Rule also prohibits the use of evidence of subsequent
remedial measures to prove other things such as "culpable conduct; a defect in a product or
its design; or a need for a warning or instruction." Id. See also Appendix.
85. See FED. R. EvID. 407.
86. See id. advisory committee's note (stating that subsequent remedial measures are
"not in fact an admission [of negligence], since the conduct is equally consistent with injury
by mere accident or through contributory negligence").
87. Id. (discussing the "social policy of encouraging people to take, or at least not
discouraging them from taking, steps in furtherance of added safety").
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Finally, Rule 407 also allows exceptions in the interest of fairness in the
advocacy process. To comprehend this category of rules, one might think
of a trial as a game and the rules of evidence as governing the game. The
players of the game make choices about what evidence to offer and how
to challenge the evidence offered by their opponents. Sometimes a party
may take unfair advantage of an opponent by exploiting the protections
afforded to that party under the rules. With subsequent remedial mea-
sures, the general prohibition on the use of this evidence protects parties
taking such measures from the use of these measures as adverse evidence;
however, the party can "open the door" to the evidence by disputing
"ownership, control, or the feasibility of precautionary measures."88
When a party disputes an issue such as feasibility, the FRE consider the
party to have "opened the door" for the opponent to prove feasibility. 89
It would be a perversion of justice to allow the party to dispute the feasi-
bility of a safety measure that it has already taken and not allow the op-
posing party to put that evidence before the jury. Thus, Rule 407's
protective cloak no longer applies if a party disputes an issue on which
the fact that the party has implemented the subsequent remedial measure
is probative evidence. In the interest of adversarial fairness, the FRE
essentially discourage a party from unfairly exploiting their protections.
Evidentiary privileges arguably represent the only type of evidence
rule (other than the few purely procedural or definitional provisions) 90
that do not advance the search for truth.91 Evidentiary privileges instead
promote the integrity of important relationships like that between
spouses. 92 Protecting the spousal relationship promotes societal goals
such as maintaining strong marriages and families, which foster a more
stable and productive society. These rules impede the search for truth by
excluding certain evidence, rendering the presentation of a party's case
incomplete, not by admitting evidence that introduces inaccurate, mis-
leading, or prejudicial information and makes the trial less reliable. In
other words, these rules do not allow for the admission of unreliable evi-
88. See FED. R. EVID. 407.
89. See FED. R. EVID. 407 advisory committee's note ("The requirement that the other
purpose [of admitting the evidence, such as feasibility] be controverted calls for automatic
exclusion unless a genuine issue be present and allows the opposing party to lay the
groundwork for exclusion by making an admission [of feasibility].").
90. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
91. See Katherine Goldwasser, Vindicating the Right to Trial by Jury and the Require-
ment of Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt: A Critique of the Conventional Wisdom About
Excluding Defense Evidence, 86 GEo. L.J. 621, 643 n.133 (1998). At the same time, one
might argue that the attorney-client privilege advances the search for truth by protecting
the relationship of client and counsel and thereby advancing the efficacy of legal represen-
tation. Thus, the attorney-client privilege may paradoxically both impede and advance the
search for truth.
92. MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 71, § 5.31, at 397 ("The rationale for the
[spousal] testimonial privilege is to protect the harmony and sanctity of the marital rela-
tionship."); id. § 5.32, at 400-01 ("The rationale of the [spousal communications] privilege
is to protect the privacy and trust of the marital relationship and enable spouses freely to
communicate and confide in one another.").
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dence. Rather, they operate to exclude potentially reliable evidence. 93
They affect the "search for truth" by increasing the likelihood that a party
will be unable to prove the issues otherwise provable with the excluded
evidence. 94 When a privilege excludes defense evidence, it increases the
possibility of a wrongful conviction. When it excludes prosecution evi-
dence, it increases the possibility of a wrongful acquittal.
Concerns about the potential for evidentiary privileges to impede the
search for truth have led courts to construe privileges narrowly and rec-
ognize numerous exceptions. 95 In so doing, courts have minimized any
major, unnecessary distortion of the truth-seeking process. Experience
has shown that rules of this type have not so impeded the search for truth
as to call their justifiability into question, nor does the existence of these
rules suggest that the drafters of the FRE were unconcerned with reliabil-
ity. 96 On the contrary, at most this category of rules reflects a concession
to the reliability paradigm, a recognition that the search for truth must
sometimes yield to more important societal interests.
In summary, with the exception of evidentiary privileges, rules that ad-
vance secondary purposes also advance reliability. The vast majority of
the remaining rules are based solely on a reliability rationale, and a hand-
ful of rules are purely procedural. From this examination, one can clearly
see the reliability paradigm that forms the theoretical foundation of the
Federal Rules of Evidence.
4. Evidentiary "Reliability" Versus Witness "Credibility"
Evidentiary reliability is to be distinguished from witness credibility.
The distinction is critical because it is understood that the role of the jury
is to evaluate witness credibility and to determine how much weight to
assign evidence in "finding the facts. ' 97 Trial courts, on the other hand,
93. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 50 (1980) (stating that testimonial exclu-
sionary rules and privileges contravene the fundamental principle that "the public.., has a
right to every man's evidence") (internal citations and quotations omitted).
94. The attorney-client privilege also promotes an instrumental objective of facilitating
the rendition of legal services, which may improve the functioning of the adversary system
and have a possibly salutary effect on the search for truth.
95. Trammel, 445 U.S. at 50. (Evidentiary privileges "must be strictly construed and
accepted only to the very limited extent that permitting a refusal to testify or excluding
relevant evidence has a public good transcending the normally predominant principle of
utilizing all rational means for ascertaining truth. (internal citations and quotations
omitted)").
96. Congress rejected the drafters' proposed evidentiary privilege rules, deciding in-
stead that privileges should continue to be developed by the courts at common law "in the
light of reason and experience." See FED. R. EVID. 501. Thus, the FRE do not actually
contain rules defining the scope of evidentiary privileges.
97. McCormick refers to the distinction between facts found by the court and those
reserved for the jury as one between "preliminary questions of fact arising on objections"
as opposed to the historical facts pertaining to the merits of the case. See MCCORMICK ON
EVIDENCE § 53, at 234-38 (5th ed. 1999). The treatise explains that the rules of evidence
such as the hearsay rules frequently exclude relevant evidence unless the court finds that
certain foundational or preliminary facts exist. The task of making these findings of fact
falls to the court within its authority over evidentiary admissibility under Rule 104. Id. at
234. As to these foundational issues, "[tjhe judge acts as a factfinder in determining the
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make preliminary factual findings solely as part of admissibility determi-
nations, most of which involve implicit reliability assessments. 98
The best illustration of the credibility/reliability distinction is found in
the rules that regulate witness impeachment. The rules presuppose that
some lay witnesses will be less credible (i.e., worthy of belief) than
others.99 Clearly, the testimony of an untruthful witness, if believed,
would lead to an unreliable outcome, but not because the substance of
the testimony is inherently unreliable, misleading, or prone to evoke un-
fair prejudice. The unreliability arises from facts and circumstances that
make that particular witness unworthy of belief. For example, a witness in
a breach of contract case may offer testimony about the number of prod-
ucts the defendant delivered to the plaintiff's business. The witness's
credibility may be called into question because she is the mother of one
of the parties and thus viewed as biased in favor of that party.100 The
substance of her testimony is not inherently "unreliable" in the sense that
we usually trust witnesses to give fairly accurate accounts of "what hap-
pened" in a typical case. t01 However, the witness may nonetheless be less
"credible" because of her strong bias due to the familial relationship. The
existence of the foundational fact. The judge may consider the credibility of the founda-
tional testimony. Thus, the judge can decide to disbelieve the proponent's testimony even
if it is facially sufficient." Id. at 236. On the other hand, jurors must render a verdict on
the evidence, which requires both assessing the credibility of witnesses and weighing evi-
dence to make the factual determination of whether the defendant should be held civilly or
criminally liable. In only a few instances do the FRE assign jurors a preliminary factfind-
ing role on evidentiary matters; these pertain to evidence for which the logical relevancy
depends on the existence of a preliminary fact. Id. at 236-37. The Rules explicitly apply
this procedure to findings about a witness's personal knowledge under Rule 602 and au-
thentication under Rule 901. Id. at 238.
98. Id. at 234-36.
99. For example, the Rules specifically regulate the impeachment of a witness's "char-
acter for truthfulness," which is presumably tarnished by evidence of past misdeeds not
resulting in convictions, as well as evidence of past convictions. See FED. R. EVID. 608,609.
A witness may also lack credibility based on the testimony of another witness who may
give a negative opinion of the witness's character for truthfulness or may report that the
witness has developed a bad reputation for character for truthfulness. See FED. R. EVID.
608. Additionally, witnesses who testify inconsistently with their prior statements are
viewed as less credible than those who tell a consistent story. See FED. R. EVID. 612.
100. In addition to bias or improper motive, witnesses may also be impeached on other
grounds such as having a bad character for truth, which can be proved by showing their
prior criminal histories or bad acts, or through opinion or reputation testimony of another
witness. MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 71, §§ 6.23-.29, at 476-94. A witness's
testimony may also be impeached on the grounds of a lack of mental or sensory perception
or that the witness made prior inconsistent statements. Id. §§ 6.21, at 473-75 & 6.40, at
519-24.
The FRE explicitly regulate certain types of impeachment. See FED. R. EvID. 608 (non-
conviction misconduct); FED. R. EVID. 609 (prior convictions); FED. R. EVID. 613 (prior
inconsistent statements). The FRE are silent on other traditional forms of impeachment,
but the courts have nonetheless recognized these as proper forms of impeachment. See
MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 71, §§ 6.19-.21, at 466-75 (addressing impeachment
by showing the witness's bias or motive to lie or by showing a lack of mental or sensory
capacity); id. §§ 6.43-.44, at 529-35 (addressing impeachment by contradiction).
101. If there are unusual circumstances that might render the witness's account unrelia-
ble (such as the witness being too young, mentally unstable, or intoxicated at the time),
jurors are capable of assessing the reliability of this type of testimony. In contrast, jurors
have been shown to lack the necessary understanding of the factors affecting the reliability
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FRE do not contemplate that courts should exclude the testimony of wit-
nesses who may be lacking in credibility. Rather, the witnesses should be
permitted to testify-assuming the testimony is admissible under the
rules' 0 2-and the opposing party is allowed to impeach the witness's
credibility. 10 3 The impeachment process allows the jury to assign the
proper weight to the testimony based on the witness's credibility.10 4
In the American adversarial system, impeachment during cross-exami-
nation represents the quintessential clash of adversaries from which truth
emerges.10 5 Thus, although a judge could in theory find a thoroughly im-
peachable witness to be so lacking in credibility as to be of no legitimate
value to the jury, the FRE do not contemplate that the court will pre-
clude the witness from testifying on credibility grounds.10 6 The Rules in-
stead allow any qualified witness to testify.10 7 Of course, other rules such
as the hearsay rules might limit the testimony the witness would be al-
lowed to offer, but the limitations would be based on purposes other than
a lack of credibility.' 0 8 Witness credibility alone never poses an obstacle
of eyewitness identifications of strangers, such as weapon-focus effects, the effects of sug-
gestion, and cross-race identifications. See infra notes 198-200.
102. Any concerns about the reliability of the witness's testimony are addressed by the
evidence rules, such as the hearsay rules, as applied by the court in deciding admissibility
and, in the final analysis, by the jury, which is qualified to make such judgments in the
ordinary case. See supra notes 69-74 and accompanying text.
103. See FED. R. EvID. 607.
104. See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 71, § 6.18, at 464-65 (describing five
modes of impeaching a witness's credibility).
105. See STEVEN LUBET, MODERN TRIAL ADVOCACY: ANALYSIS & PRACTICE 79
(2009) (describing cross-examination as the hallmark of the Anglo-American system of
adversarial justice); MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 97, § 19, at 87-88 (noting that
"[flor two centuries, common law judges and lawyers have regarded the opportunity to
cross-examine as an essential safeguard of the accuracy and completeness of testimony");
see also William Wayne Justice, The Origins of Ruiz v. Estelle, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1, 7 (1990)
(describing the adversarial system as involving "two antagonistic parties of roughly equal
strength who become embroiled in a dispute").
106. The court is empowered simply to control the impeachment process so that it ad-
vances the search for truth. See FED. R. EVID. 611(a) (providing for cross-examination by
leading questions and allowing the judge to "exercise reasonable control over the mode
and order of examining witnesses and presenting evidence so as to... make those proce-
dures effective for determining the truth.").
107. At one time, the common law evidence rules restricted certain classes of people
from testifying, such as parties, spouses of parties, accomplices, convicted felons, children,
and atheists. See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 71, § 6.2, at 420. The FRE signifi-
cantly liberalized witness qualifications, allowing even children and the insane to testify if
shown to understand the oath. Id. (discussing Rule 601). "Lay witness" refers to any non-
expert witness. See FED. R. EVID. 701, 702 (regulating the extent to which expert and non-
expert witnesses may testify in the form of opinion).
108. See supra note 46 and accompanying text. In the criminal context, constitutional
rules may also affect the admissibility of lay witness testimony. Often constitutional tests
focus on the appropriateness of police procedures in gathering the evidence, which may
affect reliability, but reliability per se is generally not a sufficient ground for exclusion. See
Mark A. Godsey, Reliability Lost, False Confessions Discovered, 10 CHAP. L. REV. 623,
624-28 (2007) (tracing historical treatment of reliability in confessions law to the present
day, where it is no longer an independently relevant factor); Paul Marcus, It's Not Just
About Miranda: Determining the Voluntariness of Confessions in Criminal Prosecutions, 40
VAL. U. L. REV. 601, 609-11 (2006) (discussing Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 163
(1986)); Thompson, Judicial Gatekeeping, supra note 18, at 39 n.191 (observing that "iden-
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to witness testimony. 10 9 The rules leave it to the jury to evaluate the
witness's demeanor evidence and to hear impeachment evidence to deter-
mine whether a witness is worthy of belief.110
Even in this area quintessentially reserved for jurors, the rules ascribe
to trial judges the task of safeguarding the search for truth by policing the
presentation of impeachment evidence. Procedurally, Rule 611 explicitly
charges trial courts to "exercise reasonable control over the mode and
order of examining witnesses and presenting evidence so as to ... make
those procedures effective for determining the truth."11' Substantively,
the impeachment rules that pertain to witness credibility explicitly set
aside a role for the judge to ensure the reliability of the impeachment
evidence. 112 Reflecting the same kinds of concerns that underlie Rule
403, the FRE call on the court to balance the right of an opposing party
to impeach a witness against the need for the witness's testimony. 113 Wit-
ness credibility should not be attacked in such a way as to unfairly
prejudice the party offering the witness's testimony, because this could
cause a jury to behave irrationally and render an unreliable verdict. In
other words, a party's impeachment evidence should reliably inform the
jury's judgment of the witness's credibility.
For instance, a witness may have prior criminal convictions that jurors
should consider in deciding whether to believe the witness, but not all
prior convictions have a bearing on a witness's character for truthfulness
(i.e., credibility), and some may be too remote in time to have much rele-
vance to the witness's present credibility. 1 4 Such prior convictions would
serve only to evoke a negative emotional reaction, causing the jury to
give less weight to the witness's testimony and potentially skewing the
outcome against the party offering the testimony without justification in
fact. Impeachment rules such as Rule 609 call on trial courts to assess
impeachment evidence to assure that it promotes the accuracy of the trial
verdict, leaving the jury only to weigh the evidence in light of witness
credibility.1 15
tification does not violate due process unless threshold finding is made that police used
suggestive practices, thus courts do not reach reliability issue unless the police are found to
have acted improperly").
109. The rules do not make the lack of credibility a valid ground for disqualifying a
witness. See FED. R. EVID. 601-05. Long-standing practice leaves credibility matters to thejury for a variety of reasons. See generally RANDOLPH N. JONAKAIT, THE AMERICAN JURY
SYSTEM 51-59 (2003) (addressing the rationale for designating credibility as a jury issue).
110. See supra notes 99-104.
111. FED. R. EVID. 611 (emphasis added); see also supra note 105 and accompanying
text.
112. See FED. R. EVID. 608-10, 613.
113. See FED. R. EviD. 609.
114. Id.
115. Again, in the ordinary case, any concerns about unreliability of the witness's testi-
mony would also be judged by the jury in the final analysis. See supra note 51. The court
makes the initial reliability determination by applying the FRE (and to a lesser extent
constitutional rules) in its gatekeeping capacity. Id.
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B. SOME PROCEDURAL PROVISIONS CALL FOR
JUDICIAL GATEKEEPING
Even some of the provisions that govern the procedural aspect of the
evidentiary process support the argument that courts bear the primary
responsibility for reliability gatekeeping.116 These rules do not bear di-
rectly on the substantive question of the admissibility of unreliable evi-
dence because they are purely procedural, not literally "rules of
evidence." Nonetheless, the procedural rules support the proposition
that trial courts should determine questions of admissibility, which by im-
plication assigns courts a gatekeeping function to screen evidence for
reliability.
For example, several of the FRE delineate the role of judge and jury in
the trial process, and these reserve a greater role for the jury on questions
that involve "credibility" more than they involve "reliability." Rule 104,
for example, clearly defines the institutional role of the judge as gate-
keeper. 117 The judge should determine general questions of admissibil-
ity,118 and Rule 104(a) and (b) outline the procedures for the court to
follow depending on the type of evidence. To reiterate, since most admis-
sibility rulings turn on the court's determination of the presence of indicia
of reliability, the court's role effectively involves reliability screening.
Additionally, Rule 104(c) sets out certain protections for criminal cases
to guard against a jury even hearing evidence of a confession before the
court has ruled on its admissibility." 9 The same protection applies when
the accused is a witness, upon request by the defense,12° or simply when
justice requires.' 2 ' Once a court finds evidence to be inadmissible, the
Rules direct that "[tio the extent practicable, the court must conduct a
jury trial so that inadmissible evidence is not suggested to the jury by any
means."1 22
Thus, the FRE clearly contemplate that trial courts will make admissi-
bility determinations and carve out special procedural protections in
criminal cases so that the jury cannot even hear sensitive evidence before
the court has ruled it admissible. In such cases, the court would not be
able to "unring the bell" by issuing a jury instruction to disregard the
evidence or to consider the evidence for only a limited purpose. 123 More-
over, courts must prevent jurors from hearing any inadmissible evidence
to the extent practicable. These procedural rules underscore the impor-
tance of the judge's role in screening evidence so as to protect criminal
116. For a list of the FRE and their respective purposes, see Appendix.
117. Rule 104(a) establishes the court's gatekeeping role for most evidence, while Rule
104(b) gives the court a more limited screening function. See supra note 43.
118. Id.
119. FED. R. EVID. 104(C)(1).
120. FED. R. EVID. 104(c)(2).
121. FED. R. EVID. 104 (c)(3).
122. FED. R. EVID. 103(d).
123. Rule 105 requires such a limiting instruction upon request if evidence is admitted
for one purpose but not another. FED. R. EVID. 105.
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defendants from the risk that the jury will wrongly convict by hearing
unreliable, inadmissible evidence. 124
C. DAUBERT GATEKEEPING AND THE ROLE OF RULE 403
The Supreme Court's opinion in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuti-
cals, Inc. interpreted the Federal Rules of Evidence to require reliability
gatekeeping in the area of scientific expert testimony. 125 The decision
portended a new era of judicial oversight of scientific evidence, which by
most accounts is not yet fully developed.126 The failures of reliability
gatekeeping have been particularly disappointing in criminal cases. 127
124. Rule 1008 provides another good example of the judicial gatekeeping rule. For
purposes of the best evidence rule, Rule 1008 ordinarily reserves to the court the task to
"determine[ ] whether the proponent has fulfilled the factual conditions for admitting
other evidence of the content of a writing, recording, or photograph." FED. R. EvIo. 1008.
The rule necessarily tasks the jury with certain findings that necessarily involve credibility
determinations, such as whether "an asserted writing.., ever existed," "another one pro-
duced at the trial or hearing is the original," or "other evidence of content accurately re-
flects the content." Id. The Advisory Committee's notes explain that the court may
determine issues such as the loss of originals (justifying the admission of oral testimony),
which merely involves the "administration of the rule." FED. R. EVID. 1008 Advisory
Committee's notes. However, questions such as whether an asserted non-collateral writing
ever existed go to the merits of the case and turn on credibility. Id. Even so, the rule gives
courts a weak form of gatekeeping "in accordance with Rule 104(b)" on these issues. See
supra note 43.
125. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993).
126. See, e.g., Lisa Heinzerling, Doubting Daubert, 14 J.L. & POL'Y 65, 70-74, 82-83
(2006) (observing that courts have improperly applied Daubert to admit some junk science
and exclude some reliable science and arguing that the Supreme Court should model the
proper means of conducting Daubert screening). But see Victor E. Schwartz & Cary
Silverman, The Draining of Daubert and the Recidivism of Junk Science in Federal and
State Courts, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 217, 273 (2006) (finding that some courts have failed to
apply Daubert rigorously or faithfully, but Daubert has limited admissibility of junk sci-
ence). Concerns about bias among experts persist as well, but this is due to the adversarial
nature of the process, and not a criticism of Daubert or its implementation. Nonetheless
the existence or perception of bias affects the ability of fact finders to make appropriate
decisions. See, e.g., Yvette J. Bessent, Admissibility of Polygraph Evidence and Repressed
Memory Evidence When Offered by the Accused, 55 U. MIAMI L. REV. 975, 975-76 (2001)
(finding a "strong indication" that admittance depends on which party seeks to offer the
evidence and that courts admit polygraph evidence when offered by the prosecution but
exclude it when offered by the defense); Christopher Tarver Robertson, Blind Expertise, 85
N.Y.U. L. REV. 174, 177-78 (2010); Joseph Sanders, Science, Law, and the Expert Witness,
72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63, 75-77 (2009). To remedy this problem, others have en-
couraged courts to appoint experts themselves or to conduct independent research on sci-
entific issues as a means of improving the quality of their gatekeeping decisions. See, e.g.,
Edward K. Cheng, Independent Judicial Research in the Daubert Age, 56 DUKE L.J. 1263,
1270-72 (2007). However, some scholars have credited Daubert with moving courts to-
ward a more "inquisitorial posture" in assessing the quality of experts. See, e.g., Sanders,
supra, at 87.
127. The criticisms of Daubert's failings are particularly scathing in the criminal context.
See, e.g., COMM. ON IDENTIFYING THE NEEDS OF THE FORENSIC SCIENCE CMTY., NAT'L
RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT'L ACADS., STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE
UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD (2009) (finding that wide range of forensic disciplines
lack validity); M. Neil Browne & Ronda R. Harrison-Spoerl, Putting Expert Testimony in
its Epistemological Place: What Predictions of Dangerousness in Court Can Teach Us, 91
MARQ. L. REV. 1119 (2008) (testimony and nonscientific opinions, citing the example of a
frequent government expert on terrorism); Simone Ling Francini, Note, Expert Handwrit-
ing Testimony: Is the Writing Really on the Wall?, 11 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & App. ADVOC. 99,
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Nonetheless, the decision offers important lessons for properly interpret-
ing the rules of evidence.
For seventy years before Daubert, courts had admitted scientific evi-
dence under the Frye "general acceptance" standard.128 If the particular
scientific expert opinion rested on a scientific foundation that was "gener-
ally accepted" in the relevant scientific community, then the courts would
accept the opinion as sufficiently reliable for admission into evidence. 129
Over time, concerns grew regarding the proliferation of expert testimony,
the admission of "junk science" in civil toxic tort litigation, and the ability
of bad science to result in unfair findings of liability.130 The Supreme
Court responded to these concerns by addressing the admissibility of ex-
pert testimony in Daubert.131
When the Federal Rules of Evidence were adopted, the new Rule 702
made no mention of the Frye standard. 132 The omission created an inter-
pretive dilemma for the courts that went unresolved until almost twenty
years later in Daubert. Instead of adopting the "general acceptance"
standard, Rule 702 provided: "If scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to
determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge,
skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of
an opinion or otherwise . .. 133
Thus, even without explanation in the Advisory Committee's notes, the
rule simply omitted the "general acceptance" standard and did not explic-
itly provide an alternate method of testing the evidence for reliability.
Faced with this interpretive dilemma, the Court read Rule 702-in the
context of the entire body of the rules of evidence-as requiring reliabil-
ity gatekeeping for scientific expert testimony. The Court stated:
100 (2006) (arguing that adhering to Daubert standards of admissibility would preclude
admission of handwriting expertise but that the federal courts of appeal have failed to
adhere to those standards); Brandon L. Garrett & Peter J. Neufeld, Invalid Forensic Sci-
ence Testimony and Wrongful Convictions 95 VA. L. REV. 1, 89-91 (2009) (courts typically
admit prosecution forensic evidence in a highly deferential manner and do not provide
funds for defense experts); Susan Haack, Irreconcilable Differences? The Troubled Mar-
riage of Science and Law, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 22 (2009) (noting that Daubert
"has had startling[ly] little effect" on the admission of forensic evidence in criminal cases
despite the variable quality of such testimony); Michael Risinger, Navigating Expert Relia-
bility: Are Criminal Standards of Certainty Being Left on the Dock?, 64 ALB. L. REV. 99,
99-100 (finding that in civil cases, courts hold plaintiffs to high reliability standards while in
criminal cases, the government is not held to the same strict standards of reliability).
128. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 585 (citing Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir.
1923)).
129. Id. at 586.
130. See, e.g., Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 126, at 224-26 (addressing the public
policy basis of Daubert in addressing concerns about junk science in toxic tort cases).
131. Id. at 224; see also Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595-96 (noting respondent's apprehension
that "befuddled juries [will be] confounded by absurd and irrational pseudoscientific asser-
tions" under the Court's gatekeeping regime).
132. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 588.
133. FED. R. EvID. 702 (2010) (repealed Dec. 1, 2011).
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That the Frye test was displaced by the Rules of Evidence does not
mean.., that the Rules themselves place no limits on the admissibil-
ity of purportedly scientific evidence. Nor is the trial judge disabled
from screening such evidence. To the contrary, under the Rules the
trial judge must ensure that any and all scientific testimony or evi-
dence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable.134
The Court derived the requirement of reliability from the fact that the
rule applied to "scientific ... knowledge.' 1 35 "Scientific" implied infor-
mation derived by means of the scientific method, meaning that any
"[p]roposed testimony must be supported by appropriate validation-i.e.,
'good grounds,' based on what is known."'1 36 The term "knowledge" re-
ferred to "any body of known facts or to any body of ideas inferred from
such facts or accepted as truths on good grounds."'1 37 The Court derived
from the concept of "scientific knowledge" a "standard of evidentiary re-
liability" requiring judicial gatekeeping.138 However, in its next decision
on expert testimony, Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, the Court backed
away from its apparent reliance on the definition of "scientific," on which
evidentiary reliability seemed to rest. 139 Instead, it explained that "it is
the Rule's word 'knowledge,' not the words (like 'scientific') that modify
that word, that 'establishes a standard of evidentiary reliability."''' 40
Thus, the simple word "knowledge" implied that the rule only admitted
evidence that is sufficiently reliable.
The decision in Daubert next addressed the issue of gatekeeping. As a
preliminary matter, the Court recognized that the issue was whether the
proponent of the evidence could satisfy the "standard of evidentiary reli-
ability" required under the rule.' 4 ' The responsibility for making this de-
termination falls upon trial courts, which are tasked with this gatekeeping
responsibility under Rule 104(a). 142 The Court stated: "Faced with a
proffer of expert scientific testimony, then, the trial judge must determine
at the outset, pursuant to Rule 104(a)," whether the evidentiary reliabil-
ity standard has been met.143 Thus, the gatekeeping role of the trial judge
for scientific evidence was derived primarily from Rule 104(a) and not
134. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589 (citation omitted).
135. Id. at 590.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. The Court also provided some guidance to lower courts by outlining some of
the factors that trial courts should consider in determining reliability. Id. at 592-95.
139. 526 U.S. 137, 147 (1999).
140. Id. (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589-90). The Court conceded that Daubert
spoke only of "scientific" knowledge, but it did so "'because that [wa]s the nature of the
expertise' at issue." Id. at 148 (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590).
141. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590.
142. Rule 104(a) states: "The court must decide any preliminary question about
whether a witness is qualified, a privilege exists, or evidence is admissible. In so deciding,
the court is not bound by evidence rules, except those on privilege." FED. R. EvID. 104(a).
143. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592.
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based on Rule 403 as some have proposed in other contexts. 144
The final interpretive lesson of the Daubert methodology lies in the
message that courts should interpret a particular rule in the context of
other pertinent rules. The Court explained:
Throughout, a judge assessing a proffer of expert scientific testi-
mony under Rule 702 should also be mindful of other applicable
rules. [The Court cites Rules 703 and 706 as examples.] . . . Finally,
Rule 403 permits the exclusion of relevant evidence "if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury.' 1 45
Rules 703 and 706 pertain specifically to the admissibility of expert tes-
timony, whereas Rule 403 applies generally to all forms of evidence.
From Rule 403, the Court derived further support for the general pro-
position that the trial court's role is to oversee evidentiary reliability
screening. The Court inferred a gatekeeping role by quoting Judge Wein-
stein, who wrote: "Expert evidence can be both powerful and quite mis-
leading because of the difficulty in evaluating it. Because of this risk, the
judge in weighing possible prejudice against probative force under Rule
403 of the present rules exercises more control over experts than over lay
witnesses." 14 6
Reference to Rule 403 served to pinpoint the source of a trial court's
gatekeeping role in that the Rule's purpose is to protect the opponent of
evidence from the admission of misleading (and hence, truth-distorting)
evidence. Trial courts have a duty to prevent the jury from hearing evi-
dence that is both "powerful and quite misleading because of the diffi-
culty in evaluating it."147
However, while the Court referred to Rule 403 in discussing the role of
the trial court, it did not apply it directly. Rule 702 serves as "the primary
locus of [the gatekeeping] obligation," and the other rules serve only to
guide the courts in interpreting the substance and procedure to be fol-
lowed in applying Rule 702.148 As a result, the burden to establish relia-
bility remains with the proponent of the evidence, and the proponent
must carry this burden by the typical evidentiary quantum of a prepon-
derance of the evidence. 149 If the Court had applied Rule 403 directly, it
would have implied that the evidence was otherwise admissible, and thus
the opponent of the evidence would bear the burden to prove that the
evidence's misleading nature "substantially outweighs" its probative
value. By its terms, Rule 403 gives an opponent of evidence a last chance
144. See, e.g., LEO, supra note 18, at 289-90 (on pretrial reliability hearings for confes-
sions); NATAPOFF, supra note 18, at 194 (on pretrial reliability hearings for informant
testimony).
145. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595 (internal citations omitted).
146. Id. (quoting Jack B. Weinstein, Rule 707 of the Federal Rules of Evidence Is Sound;
It Should Not Be Amended, 138 F.R.D. 631, 632 (1991)).
147. Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted).
148. Id. at 589.
149. Id. at 595 n.10.
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to have otherwise admissible evidence excluded. Rule 702, on the other
hand, provides the evidentiary foundation that the proponent of expert
testimony must satisfy in order for the testimony to be found admissible
in the first place.
In the years following Daubert, the Supreme Court handed down sev-
eral other decisions providing further guidance on the application of Rule
702.150 Then in 2000, the drafters amended Rule 702 "in response to
Daubert ... and to the many cases applying Daubert."' 15 1 The Advisory
Committee explains: "[t]he amendment affirms the trial court's role as
gatekeeper and provides some general standards that the trial court must
use to assess the reliability and helpfulness of proffered expert testi-
mony. '152 Thus, the Supreme Court initiated the change in the judicial
role in handling expert testimony, and the rule drafters acted only after
the courts had worked out many of the finer points of the process.
Daubert and its progeny identified a gatekeeping role in Rule 702 using
the plain language as a starting point, despite the fact that the rule said
nothing specifically about judicial gatekeeping or reliability. The Court
went beyond a simple reading of Rule 702 by considering it within the
context of the overall structure of the FRE and in relation to other rele-
vant provisions such as Rules 104(a), 403, 703, and 706. Only after the
Supreme Court had ironed out a number of remaining questions related
to Rule 702 over the course of several years did the Advisory Committee
revise the rule to comport with judicial practice.
III. RECENT CASE LAW ON EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION
SUPPORTS EVIDENTIARY GATEKEEPING
BUT FALLS SHORT
The burgeoning volume of wrongful convictions brought to light by the
efforts of various Innocence Projects and the invention of DNA testing
have led to piecemeal efforts to improve the reliability of eyewitness
identification evidence by law enforcement agencies, reform groups, state
legislatures, and state high courts across the country. 153 The changes
have aimed to improve the process by which the police gather identifica-
tion testimony. 15 4 Reducing the incidence of police suggestion in the col-
lection of identification evidence represents an important goal for the
criminal justice system.
In considering the landscape of eyewitness identification reform,
"front-end" quality assurance might include the adoption of best prac-
150. See, e.g., Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999); Gen. Elec. Co. v.
Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997).
151. FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee's note.
152. Id.
153. For a discussion of the development of best practices for law enforcement, see
Sandra Guerra Thompson, What Price Justice? The Importance of Costs to Eyewitness
Identification Reform, 41 TEX. TECH L. REV. 33 (2008) (comparing principle features of
best practices) [hereinafter What Price Justice?].
154. Id. at 43-54.
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tices by law enforcement that can improve the quality of the evidence
brought to court. To date, only a minority of states have instituted best
practices as a matter of state law.1 55 Thus, in most states, law enforce-
ment agencies can legally continue to follow the same suggestive prac-
tices that have produced wrongful convictions in the past.156
For their part, a few state courts have adopted "back-end" remedial
measures such as jury instructions and expert testimony that can improve
the accuracy of the deliberative process. 157 These remedies provide ju-
rors with greater information about the possible weaknesses of the testi-
mony after it has been heard in court.
In attempts to prevent jurors from hearing unreliable identification evi-
dence, a few courts have also tweaked the federal due process test (for
state due process purposes) to provide somewhat better reliability screen-
ing.158 However, no state court engaged in broad-based reliability
screening until the New Jersey Supreme Court undertook the task in the
2011 decisions in State v. Henderson 59 and State v. Chen.160 Henderson
and Chen break new ground by putting the focus on judicial gatekeeping
for evidentiary reliability at the point when it is proffered, before it is
heard by the jury.
In Henderson, the court, by means of the appointment of a special
master, engaged in a comprehensive study of the scientific literature on
eyewitness identification reliability factors. The decision provides a
roadmap for lower courts in conducting reliability gatekeeping as a mat-
ter of state constitutional law for cases involving police suggestion. Fol-
lowing on the heels of Henderson, the court in Chen extended reliability
gatekeeping pursuant to the rules of evidence to cases not involving po-
lice suggestion. a61 Together, Henderson and Chen represent a major ad-
vance in the conceptualization of reliability gatekeeping by trial courts.
Both decisions focus on whether identification evidence is sufficiently re-
liable to be admitted against an accused in a criminal case, first as a mat-
ter of constitutional law in Henderson and then pursuant to the rules of
evidence in Chen.
155. Id. at 61-62.
156. Id.
157. See Thompson, Eyewitness Identifications, supra note 16, at 628-30 (discussing case
law). See also Tillman v. State, 354 S.W.3d 425, 442 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (holding that
trial court abused its discretion when it excluded reliable, relevant expert testimony that
would have assisted the jury).
158. See Thompson, Eyewitness Identifications, supra note 16, at 623-26. Ostensibly, the
federal due process test turns on reliability, but in fact the test has proven virtually futile in
preventing the admission of unreliable identification. See Sandra Guerra Thompson, Judi-
cial Blindness to Eyewitness Misidentification, 93 MARO. L. REV. 639, 642 (2009) (finding
no state appellate decision in a one-year empirical study of state appellate case law that
excluded identification as inadmissible on due process grounds). Moreover, in Perry v.
New Hampshire, the Court recently made clear that reliability considerations alone-with-
out the presence of police suggestion-cannot trigger due process protection. See infra
notes 220-24 and accompanying text.
159. 27 A.3d 872, 878 (N.J. 2011).
160. 27 A.3d 930, 942-43 (N.J. 2011).
161. Id. at 940.
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Unfortunately, Henderson practically instructs lower courts to continue
to admit identifications as usual, calling for jury instructions (and not ex-
pert testimony) as the means of addressing reliability issues. 162 The ex-
pectation set in Henderson to continue admitting identifications while
adopting a more aggressive use of jury instructions seriously undercuts
the potential of pretrial gatekeeping to change the status quo in a mean-
ingful way. Chen also falls short by misapplying the interpretive lessons
of Daubert regarding the gatekeeping function of the trial court. The
opinion misapplies Rule 403 and imposes an extremely high burden on
the defendant to prove the grounds of exclusion, rather than placing the
burden on the prosecution to prove the reliability of the evidence by a
preponderance of the evidence as a precondition to admission. Thus,
Henderson and Chen provide a glimpse of comprehensive reliability
gatekeeping, but the implementation of this new evidentiary review has
low potential to reduce wrongful convictions.
A. HENDERSON AND CHEN DEFINE NEW IDENTIFICATION
RELIABILITY FRAMEWORKS UNDER STATE DUE PROCESS
AND RULES OF EVIDENCE
In State v. Henderson, the New Jersey Supreme Court rejected the fed-
eral due process test for eyewitness identifications outlined in Manson v.
Brathwaite163 for purposes of determining state due process claims, out-
lining a broader, science-based approach. In Henderson, the defendant
challenged the eyewitness identification evidence as unconstitutionally
unreliable, alleging that the officers had "intervened during the identifi-
cation process and unduly influenced the eyewitness.' 1 64 In an unusual
move, the New Jersey high court appointed a special master to preside
over a hearing on remand to consider the continued viability of the Man-
162. Henderson, 27 A.3d at 923, 925.
163. Id. at 918-24 (adopting broad reliability review in lieu of the federal test set forth
in Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977)). The New Jersey Supreme Court had previ-
ously embraced Manson in State v. Madison, 536 A.2d 254 (N.J. 1988). Henderson, 27
A.3d at 929.
164. Id. at 877. In Henderson, the eyewitness, James Womble, witnessed the murder of
his friend, Rodney Harper, who was shot to death. Id. at 879. As the shooter and his
accomplice left, the accomplice warned Womble not to "rat [him] out," saying, "I know
where you live." Id. at 879. When the police interviewed Womble on the day of the killing,
he gave an account denying that he had witnessed the murder. Id. Ten days after the
shooting, detectives confronted Womble about inconsistencies in his story. Id. (Womble
would later claim that these officers threatened to charge him in connection with the homi-
cide.) Womble now agreed to "'come clean,"' and he led police to Clark who, in turn,
named Henderson as his accomplice. Id. at 879-80. Womble identified Henderson in a
photo array as Clark's companion. Id. at 880. For his part, Henderson admitted he was at
the scene, but he denied watching or assisting in the shooting. Id. During a pretrial Wade
hearing on the eyewitness identification's admissibility, testimony was adduced that two
weeks after the shooting Womble had eliminated all but two photos, one of which was
Henderson's, but he was unable to identify Henderson. Id. at 881; see also United States v.
Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967). Officers encouraged Womble to "'just do what you have to do,
and we'll be out of here."' Henderson, 27 A.3d at 881. Womble testified during the Wade
hearing that one of the detectives "nudg[ed]" him to select the photo of Henderson. Id.
Even so, he did not recant the identification at trial. Id.
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son framework as a matter of state constitutional law. 165 The hearing
covered over 200 publications regarding human memory and eyewitness
identification, and the special master heard from several distinguished ex-
perts.166 After reviewing the voluminous information documented by the
special master, the supreme court found the current Manson framework
had proved inadequate to deal with the inherent shortcomings of eyewit-
ness identifications.167 Despite the State's protestations that the "Court
should defer to other branches of government to deal with the evolving
social scientific landscape," the court opined that it "remain[ed] the
Court's obligation to guarantee that constitutional requirements are met,
and to ensure the integrity of criminal trials."'1 68
The court rejected the Manson test for several reasons. 169 Under Man-
son, due process only applies to cases that feature "impermissibly sugges-
tive" police practices. 170 If a court finds that an identification is tainted
by impermissibly suggestive procedures, then the court turns to the ques-
tion of whether the identification is nonetheless sufficiently reliable to be
admitted. Reliability is determined by considering a five-factored "total-
ity of the circumstances" test. 71 The court found that three of the five
factors-the opportunity to view the crime, the witness's degree of atten-
tion, and the level of certainty at the time of the identification-are based
on self-reports by the witnesses. 172 However, self-reports can be skewed
by suggestive police practices in the first place, so a test that relies heavily
on self-reported factors may yield a false determination of reliability. 173
In addition, Manson does a poor job of deterrence because it ironically
rewards the most suggestive practices. As the court explained:
165. Id. at 884.
166. Id. at 884-85.
167. Id. at 885-919.
168. Id. at 913-14. The court also required law enforcement officers to record witness
confidence statements at the time of the identification because scientific studies show wit-
ness confidence and witness memory can be distorted by confirmatory feedback. Id. at
913-14, 926. The court cited its supervisory authority over state courts contained in the
New Jersey Constitution, art. VI, § 2, 3. See id. at 914.
169. Id. at 918-20. For a discussion of the many failings of the Manson test, see Thomp-
son, Eyewitness Identifications, supra note 16, at 608-21.
170. This restriction on the scope of due process protection was confirmed by the
United States Supreme Court after Henderson was decided in Perry v. New Hampshire,
132 S. Ct. 716, 731 (2012).
171. Henderson, 27 A.3d at 890. To assess the totality of the circumstances, the Court
specified five considerations taken from its prior decision in Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188,
199-200 (1972). Id. These five factors include: "(1) the opportunity of the witness to view
the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness' degree of attention; (3) the accuracy
his prior description of the criminal; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated at the confron-
tation; and (5) the time between the crime and the confrontation." Id. (internal citations
and quotations omitted).
172. Id. at 918. The state of Utah has modified the five factors to eliminate the "witness
confidence" factor as scientific studies have found no correlation between witness confi-
dence and reliability. See Thompson, Eyewitness Identifications, supra note 16, at 625-26.
They have also added other factors such as whether the identification was cross-racial,
which has been shown to reduce reliability. Id.
173. Henderson, 27 A.3d at 918.
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The irony of the current test is that the more suggestive the proce-
dure, the greater the chance eyewitnesses will seem confident and
report better viewing conditions. Courts in turn are encouraged to
admit identifications based on criteria that have been tainted by the
very suggestive practices the test aims to deter.174
The court also faulted the typical way in which courts have applied the
Manson test. Although ostensibly the reliability determination should be
based on a "totality of the circumstances," in fact courts apply the Man-
son five-factored test as a checklist, and thus do not consider a wide array
of other factors that bear on reliability. 175 The court also faulted the ex-
isting framework for its "all-or-nothing" approach of limiting courts to
the options of suppression or admission,17 6 rather than sanctioning the
use of intermediate remedies such as the use of jury instructions and ex-
pert testimony.
Rejecting the Manson test, the New Jersey court adopted a "revised
framework. 1 77 The court held that a defendant still retains the initial
burden to show "evidence of suggestiveness that could lead to a mistaken
identification. 1 78 Police officers can affect the accuracy of an eyewit-
ness's memory by using suggestive practices that distort memory, such as
by using lineups or photo arrays that make a suspect "stand out" or that
may artificially inflate a witness's confidence in the accuracy of the identi-
fication. 179 The factors over which the legal system has control and which
can introduce suggestiveness are referred to as "system variables."180
The court cited the extensive scientific research and expert testimony that
was heard at the remand hearing and cited in the opinion of the special
master. Based on this research, the court identified nine types of system
variables that lower courts should take into account:
(1) whether the lineup procedure involved blind or double-blind
administration to ensure the administrator had no knowledge of
where the suspect appeared in the photo array or lineup;
(2) whether neutral, pre-identification instructions were utilized
warning that the suspect may not be present in the lineup and that
the witness should not feel compelled to make an identification;
(3) whether the lineup contained only one suspect embedded
among at least five innocent fillers and that the suspect did not stand
out from other members of the lineup;
(4) whether the witness received any information or feedback
from the administrator about the suspect or crime before, during, or
after the identification procedure;
174. Id.
175. Id. at 919.
176. Id. at 918-19.
177. Id. at 919.
178. Id. at 920.
179. For a more comprehensive discussion of suggestive practices, see Thompson, Be-
yond a Reasonable Doubt, supra note 18, at 1504-06.
180. Id.
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(5) whether the administrator recorded the witness's statement of
confidence immediately after the identification and before the possi-
bility of any confirmatory feedback;
(6) whether the witness viewed the suspect more than once as part
of multiple identification procedures and whether the police used the
same fillers more than once;
(7) whether a "showup" was used more than two hours after the
event and whether the police warned the witness that the suspect
might not be present and the witness should not feel compelled to
make an identification;
(8) whether law enforcement had elicited from the eyewitness
whether he or she had spoken with actors other than law enforce-
ment and, if so, what was discussed; and
(9) whether the witness had made any failed attempts to identify
the culprit, either identifying no one or misidentifying a filler. 181
Once the defendant offers proof of suggestion, the state would be re-
quired to show that the identification was nonetheless reliable.
Henderson requires trial courts to consider both "system" and "estima-
tor variables," which refer to the factors affecting reliability that pertain
solely to the eyewitness and the circumstances surrounding the initial
viewing of the culprit or the viewing of the suspect when the identifica-
tion was made.182 The court addressed eight estimator variables and their
effects on witness memory, plus the five Manson factors:
(1) whether there was high stress during the crime;
(2) whether a weapon was visible during a crime of short duration
(weapon focus effects);
(3) duration of time witness saw event;
(4) the distance between the witness and perpetrator and the light-
ing conditions;
(5) characteristics of the witness such as whether witness was
under the influence of alcohol or drugs, as well as the age of witness;
(6) characteristics of the perpetrator such as use of disguise or
whether perpetrator had different facial features, such as beards, at
the time of the crime;
(7) time between crime and identification (memory decay); and
(8) the presence of cross-racial identification.1 8 3
The following chart shows the numerous factors relating to eyewitness
reliability for which the court reviewed scientific literature, and it shows
the effects the court found each of the factors have on the reliability of a
particular identification:
181. Henderson, 27 A.3d at 920-21; see also Thompson, Beyond a Reasonable Doubt?,
supra note 18, at 1501-06.
182. Henderson, 27 A.3d at 920-21; see also Thompson, Beyond a Reasonable Doubt?,
supra note 16, at 1499.





RELIABILITY FACTORS AND THEIR EFFECTS AS OUTLINED
IN HENDERSON
Suggestive Practices Effect Estimator Variables Effect
Suggestive Police Practices High Stress
("System Variables")
Non-Blind Administration - Weapon Focus
Fail to Give Instructions - Duration of Event + or -
Suggestive Lineups or Photo - Distance & Lighting + or -
Arrays*
Confirmatory Feedback - Elderly & Children
Recording Confidence Statements E Own-Age Identifications by Elderly +
Witnesses
Multiple Viewings (e.g., use of - Intoxication
previously viewed mugshot in
photo array)
Simultaneous Administration** I Use of Disguises (sunglasses, hats, -
masks, changes in facial hair)
Showups (more than 2 hours after - Memory Decay over Time -
the crime)
Police Questioning on Private E Cross-Racial Identification -
Actor Suggestiveness
Other Failed Identification - Speed of Identification I
Attempts
Private Actor Suggestive Practices Opportunity to View Criminal at + or -
Time of Crime
Cross-Witness Information Sharing - Degree of Attention + or -
and Confirmatory Feedback
+ = Increases reliability
- = Decreases reliability
E = Facilitates better evaluation of identification reliability
I = Court found the evidence regarding the factor's effect on reliability to be inconclusive
*The court considered three factors: (1) suspects should not "stand out" but should "be
included in a lineup of 'look-alikes' "; (2) the lineup should include a minimum of five fillers;
and (3) lineups should not feature more than one suspect. Henderson, 27 A.3d at 897-98.
**The court found the evidence on simultaneous versus sequential administration of lineups
and photo arrays to be inconclusive. Unfortunately, the decision predates by one month the
report of a distinguished group of scientists confirming the superiority of sequential
administration based on extensive field studies. See GARY L. WELLS ET AL., A TEST OF THE
SIMULTANEOUS VS. SEQUENTIAL LINEUP METHODS: AN INITIAL REPORT OF THE AJS
NATIONAL EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION FIELD STUDIES § ix (2011) ("The results are
consistent with decades of laboratory research showing that the sequential procedure reduces
mistaken identifications with little or no reduction in accurate identifications.").
By outlining the many reliability factors affecting eyewitness identifica-
tions, Henderson represents a considerable jurisprudential development
on the subject of eyewitness identification. 184 In particular, the court
184. I take issue with one finding made by the court. As Table 1 shows, the court found
the evidence on sequential administration of lineups to be inconclusive. A more recent,
blue-ribbon study now proves the superiority of sequential lineups. See supra tbl. 1, n.**.
Sequential lineups had already been recommended under New Jersey's Attorney General
Guidelines, as well as in other states. See Thompson, What Price Justice?, supra note 153,
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made important findings about the difficulty jurors have in properly eval-
uating identification reliability factors. The court recognized the special
master's finding that jurors are "'largely unfamiliar' with scientific find-
ings and 'often hold beliefs to the contrary."185 In one study, juror be-
liefs differed from expert opinion on identification reliability on 87% of
the issues. 186 The study found only a minority of jurors agreed with the
importance of pre-lineup instructions, the effects of the accuracy-confi-
dence relationship, weapon focus, and cross-race bias.187 Henderson
found that jurors "'gave disproportionate weight to the confidence of the
witness [as] . . . the most powerful predictor of verdicts' regardless of
other variables."1 88
Yet there were several significant shortcomings that minimize the
case's actual impact. First, the court, apparently following the same mis-
guided reasoning as the United States Supreme Court, found that due
process is not triggered unless the defendant shows police suggestive-
ness.1 89 This differed from the approaches of the special master as well as
defendant and amici, who all endorsed pretrial hearings when either sys-
tem or estimator variables existed.190 As Table 1 shows, identifications
can be unreliable for a wide variety of reasons, some of which are attribu-
table to improper police actions (generally known as "system variables")
and others which are not. In Henderson, the court made much of the
need to dispense with the federal test in favor of a more comprehensive,
science-based test including system and estimator variables that better
gauge reliability. By limiting due process claims to those that raise sys-
tem variables, the court excludes from coverage those cases implicating
only estimator variables. 191 Henderson aimed both to promote reliability
and to "deter police misconduct." 192 However, if preventing the use of
at 45-48; Henderson, 27 A.3d at 901. See also LAW ENFORCEMENT MGMT. INST. OF TEX.,
MODEL POLICY ON EYEwITNEss IDENTIFICATION (calling for sequential photo arrays and
live lineups), available at http://www.lemitonline.org/publications/documents/ewidfinal.
pdf.
185. Henderson, 27 A.3d at 910.
186. Id. (citing Tanja Rapus Benton et al., Eyewitness Memory Is Still Not Common
Sense: Comparing Jurors, Judges and Law Enforcement to Eyewitness Experts, 20 APPLIED
COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 115, 118 (2006)).
187. Id.
188. Id. at 911 (citing Brian L. Cutler et al., Juror Sensitivity to Eyewitness Identification
Evidence, 14 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 185, 186-87 (1990)).
189. I have previously critiqued the Manson rule requiring proof of suggestiveness. See
Thompson, Eyewitness Identifications, supra note 16, at 610-13.
190. Henderson, 27 A.3d at 922-23.
191. Id. The court explains its decision:
Remedying the problems with the current Manson!Madison test requires an
approach that addresses its shortcomings: one that allows judges to consider
all relevant factors that affect reliability in deciding whether an identification
is admissible; that is not heavily weighted by factors that can be corrupted by
suggestiveness; that promotes deterrence in a meaningful way; and that fo-
cuses on helping jurors both understand and evaluate the effects that various
factors have on memory-because we recognize that most identifications will
be admitted in evidence.
Id. at 919.
192. State v. Chen, 27 A.3d 930, 942 (2011) (explaining reasoning in Henderson).
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highly unreliable evidence is critical to a fair criminal trial, then this limi-
tation arbitrarily protects against only a subset of highly unreliable
identifications.
The situation might have been remedied had the court authorized pre-
trial reliability hearings for all cases raising reliability concerns that were
not already covered under the state due process test. After all, the rules
of evidence do aim to promote verdict accuracy, 193 even if this is not a
principal concern of due process. However, Chen makes clear that hear-
ings under the New Jersey Rules of Evidence are likewise severely lim-
ited. 194 In a bizarre twist of logic, the court found that evidentiary
reliability hearings should only reach cases where there is suggestiveness
by private actors (who cannot be deterred) and-to make the logic even
more bizarre-since private actors cannot be deterred, the defendant
would have to meet a higher threshold of showing highly suggestive cir-
cumstances. 195 The court imposed this restriction while at the same time
stating that "[a]bsent police involvement, ... [its] principal concern is
reliability.' 96
The court uses additional strained reasoning to explain the refusal to
review cases involving only estimator variables. The explanation implies
that judging reliability when only estimator variables are at issue some-
how infringes on the jury's domain. In Henderson, the court stated:
[I]t is difficult to imagine that a trial judge would preclude a wit-
ness from testifying because the lighting was "too dark," the witness
was "too distracted" by the presence of a weapon, or he or she was
under "too much" stress while making an observation. How dark is
too dark as a matter of law? How much is too much? What guide-
posts would a trial judge use in making those judgment calls? In all
193. See supra notes 63-81 and accompanying text.
194. The court in Henderson suggested that "enhanced [juror] instructions" would rem-
edy the failure to review for unreliability on the grounds of estimator variables alone.
Henderson, 27 A.3d at 923. The court sought to minimize the volume of hearings on ac-
count of the "practical impact of [the] ruling" which "might overwhelm the system with
little resulting benefit." Id.
195. Chen, 27 A.3d at 942-43. Chen involved private actor suggestiveness that was al-
leged to have affected the identification. In that case, Helen Kim had been attacked in her
home by an unidentified assailant wielding a knife and telephone cord. Id. at 933. Kim
met with police, who were unable to locate the suspect. Id. When Kim drew a picture of
the woman later that evening, her husband thought it could possibly be the defendant,
Cecilia Chen. Id. at 934. The husband showed Kim five to ten pictures from a website, and
Kim claimed to be "ninety percent positive" that her attacker was Chen, except for the
lack of black-rimmed glasses. Id. Kim's sister would then draw glasses on the photo, after
which Kim looked at the photographs at least five more times during the first month after
the attack. Id. Following a police investigation, Chen was indicted. Id. Police presented
Kim with a photo array for the first time twenty-two months after the attack, and Kim
identified Chen as her attacker. Id. Applying these standards to the case at issue, the
Court found that the effect of Kim's husband upon her eyewitness identification of Chen
during the photo lineup was "so highly suggestive that a pretrial hearing [was] warranted to
assess the admissibility of [Kim's] identification evidence." Id. at 944.
196. Id. at 942. So concerned was the court about limiting the availability of hearings
that both Henderson and Chen specifically instruct trial courts to end the hearing at any
time if "defendant's threshold allegation of suggestiveness [was] groundless." Id. at 943.
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likelihood, the witness would be allowed to testify before a jury and
face cross-examination designed to probe the weaknesses of her
identification. 197
The New Jersey Supreme Court seems to view these "judgment calls"
as more appropriately left to the jury without any prior screening by the
trial court. This position is both wrong and in conflict with its previously
stated rule for cases involving police suggestion. The task of assessing an
assortment of factors to determine the overall reliability of eyewitness
identification may be a difficult task that involves "judgment calls." For
example, if a suspect stands out in a lineup, how much does he stand out?
If the police used non-blind procedures, used multiple identification pro-
cedures, included two suspects in the same photo array, or unnecessarily
used a showup more than two hours after the crime, how much would
these suggestive practices affect the reliability of the identification?
These judgment calls and others like them are precisely what New
Jersey's lower courts must make in cases involving police suggestiveness.
Whether reliability is reduced due to police suggestiveness, private actor
suggestiveness, or estimator factors such as the use of disguises or cross-
racial identifications, assessing the extent of unreliability involves judg-
ment calls of the type required by reliability gatekeeping.
Moreover, the question of identification reliability is not the same as
whether the witness's identification testimony is "credible," which is a
principal judgment for the jury. The reliability judgment does not turn on
sincerity. Eyewitnesses are usually sincere but often honestly mis-
taken,198 and the error is exacerbated by a false and inflated confidence
in the accuracy of the identification.1 99 In other words, the judgment re-
garding eyewitness testimony involves two separate issues: (1) credibility,
i.e., sincerity, which turns on witness demeanor as well as grounds for
impeachment; and (2) reliability. 200
197. Henderson, 27 A.3d at 923.
198. Id. at 889 (citing Jules Epstein, The Great Engine that Couldn't: Science, Mistaken
Identity, and the Limits of Cross-Examination, 36 STETSON L. REV. 727, 772 (2007)); see
also infra note 253.
199. The court understood that witness credibility is not the important issue with eye-
witness identification. Rather, the inquiry focuses on reliability. As the court stated:
We presume that jurors are able to detect liars from truth tellers. But as
scholars have cautioned, most eyewitnesses think they are telling the truth
even when their testimony is inaccurate, and "[b]ecause the eyewitness is
testifying honestly (i.e., sincerely), he or she will not display the demeanor of
the dishonest or biased witness." Instead, some mistaken eyewitnesses, at
least by the time they testify at trial, exude supreme confidence in their
identifications.
Henderson, 27 A.3d at 889 (citing Epstein, supra note 198, at 772).
200. I concede that the credibility/reliability divide is not without some messiness. For
example, mental and sensory perception have always been considered grounds for im-
peachment, and these factors go more to witness reliability although they have been
treated as pertinent to "credibility." MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 71, § 6.21, at
473-75. I would distinguish the ordinary assessment of mental or sensory perception (e.g.,
was the witness wearing the glasses she needs to see well at a distance?) as being simple,
common-sense assessments from the non-intuitive, science-based assessments of eyewit-
ness reliability for which the judiciary is better suited to develop expertise (e.g., what is the
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Like Henderson, Chen also marks an important advance in our treat-
ment of eyewitness identification, although its success is also tempered by
the narrow reach of the rule.201 The most important breakthrough lies in
the court's authorization of pretrial reliability hearings under the New
Jersey Rules of Evidence "in light of the . . . trial courts' gatekeeping
function. '202 Like the United States Supreme Court in Daubert, the New
Jersey high court cited a panoply of rules that together support trial court
gatekeeping. First, the court observed that only relevant evidence is ad-
missible under the state's counterpart to FRE 402.203 Next, the court
cited rule 403's well-worn proposition that even if evidence possesses pro-
bative value, it may be excluded when "the risk of ... undue prejudice,
confusion of issues, or misleading the jury substantially outweighs its pro-
bative value. '20 4 The court then concluded that evidence should be ex-
cluded only if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the risk
of undue prejudice or misleading the jury.20 5 The court also cited Rule
602, which requires that witnesses have personal knowledge 20 6 and that
witnesses' "'opinions and inferences' must be 'rationally based on the[ir]
perception"' under Rule 701.207 With all of these rules in mind, the court
noted that trial courts possessed a gatekeeping function to prevent unreli-
able evidence from being introduced at trial.20 8 Further, it observed that
trial courts could enforce this function through preliminary hearings
under Rule 104.209
Chen seems at first blush to represent a dramatic departure from the
traditional application of the rules of evidence, which freely admitted
eyewitness identifications under the only specifically applicable rule, Rule
801(d)(1)(C). Chen instead relies on a cluster of rules that, taken to-
gether, authorize reliability gatekeeping, and it specifies that this
gatekeeping process should include the broad range of scientifically-
based reliability factors outlined in Henderson.210 However, gatekeeping
implies a preliminary determination of admissibility, under Daubert.
cumulative effect of the fact that the identification was cross-racial, involved a weapon, and
was obtained by suggestive police tactics?).
201. See supra notes 194-96 and accompanying text.
202. State v. Chen, 27 A.3d 930, 937 (N.J. 2011).
203. Id. Compare N.J. R. EVID. 402, with FED. R. EvID. 402 (dictating that only rele-
vant evidence is admissible).
204. Chen, 27 A.3d at 937 (internal citations and quotations omitted). Compare N.J. R.
EVID. 403, with FED. R. EVID. 403 (prohibiting introduction of evidence whose probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, as well as potentially
misleading the jury or confusing the issue).
205. Chen, 27 A.3d at 937.
206. Id. Compare N.J. R. EVID. 602, with FED. R. EVID. 602 (stating a witness may
testify "only if evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that the witness has
personal knowledge of the matter").
207. Chen, 27 A.3d at 937. Compare N.J. R. EVID. 701, with FED. R. EVID. 701 (discuss-
ing criteria for lay person opinion).
208. Chen, 27 A.3d at 937.
209. Id. at 937. Compare N.J. R. EvID. 104, with FED. R. EVID. 104 (stating that a trial
court "must conduct any hearing on a preliminary question so that the jury cannot hear it if
... justice so requires").
210. Chen, 27 A.3d at 938. See also supra tbl. 1.
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Chen instead places an initial burden on the State to show reliability, but
does not require the State to meet the Daubert preponderance standard
applied. Instead, the court in Henderson and Chen borrows from the
same Manson test that it rejected in Henderson2n1 and puts the "ultimate
burden" on the defendant to show "a very substantial likelihood of irrep-
arable misidentification. 2 12 This burden requires the defense to show
not only a high likelihood that the identification process was unreliable,
but also that the identification itself was very likely and "irreparabl[y]"
wrong.213 The court is surprisingly frank in appraising the difficulty of
meeting this burden, admitting (as in Henderson) that regardless of
whether there is a hearing, the "identification evidence will likely be
presented to the jury."214
Notwithstanding that the new gatekeeping framework ultimately en-
dorses the status quo of identification admissibility, Henderson and Chen
make other important contributions. For example, they introduce novel
intermediate remedies. The court adopted the Innocence Project's rec-
ommendation that jury charges could be given during trial and before the
witness testifies "if warranted. '215 It is an important development for trial
courts to be permitted to issue jury instructions during trial and before
the jury hears the witness's testimony. This would raise jurors' awareness
of factors bearing on reliability such as cross-racial identifications or the
effects of confirmatory feedback prior to hearing the testimony. Second,
the court concluded that in "rare cases" judges could redact parts of eye-
witness identification testimony "consistent with Rule 403."216 This, too,
represents a significant new tool available to trial courts for addressing
identification unreliability.
In summary, Henderson and Chen mark a significant advance in recog-
nizing the importance of eyewitness identification procedures and how
suggestiveness from both state and non-state actors may influence such
identifications. The New Jersey Supreme Court went to great lengths in
211. See supra notes 159-91 and accompanying text.
212. State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 878 (N.J. 2011); Chen, 27 A.3d at 942. Manson
requires the defendant to show that there is "a very substantial likelihood of irreparable
misidentification." Manson, 432 U.S. 98, 116 (1977) (citing Simmons v. United States, 390
U.S. 377, 384 (1968)).
213. The reference to "irreparable" misidentification derived from Manson might be
read to mean that some misidentifications can be repaired, in the sense that the eyewit-
nesses can later correct their mistakes and recant their misidentifications. Scientific evi-
dence shows that the opposite is true, a fact of which the court was aware. See Henderson,
27 A.3d at 878.
214. Id. Perhaps not surprisingly, the court assumed that cross-examination and jury
instructions would provide sufficient protection against erroneous eyewitness identifica-
tions. See id. at 925 ("Expert testimony may also be introduced at trial, but only if other-
wise appropriate.") (emphasis added); see also Chen, 27 A.3d at 943. The court would
support "tailored jury instructions" while discouraging courts from allowing expert wit-
nesses. Henderson, 27 A.3d at 920. It explained, "with enhanced jury instructions, there
will be less need for expert testimony." Id. at 925.
215. See Henderson, 27 A.3d at 924 (requesting that the court adopt jury instructions
that can be read to the jury both before eyewitness testimony and at the close of trial).
216. Id. at 925 (emphasis in original).
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appointing a Special Master and examining the vast array of social-sci-
ence research on the subject. At the same time, however, these cases
exemplify courts' continuing reluctance to implement reliability
gatekeeping as a procedural norm. Rejecting the recommendations of
the Special Master, the New Jersey high court established lofty burdens
for defendants to even obtain pretrial hearings, downplayed the need for
defense expert witnesses, and touted jury instructions as a cure-all.217 On
the other hand, Chen, for all its shortcomings, does stand for the proposi-
tion that a holistic view of the rules of evidence governs the admissibility
of eyewitness identifications. Properly applied, a more expansive reading
of the rules (as also seen in Daubert)218 would better protect against
wrongful conviction based on misidentifications.
B. PERRY V. NEW HAMPSHIRE REAFFIRMS RELIABILITY OF
IDENTIFICATIONS AS AN EVIDENTIARY CONCERN
In Perry v. New Hampshire, the United States Supreme Court by-
passed the opportunity to broaden the protections of the due process
clause to protect a defendant against the admission of identification testi-
mony on general unreliability grounds not involving improper suggestion
by the police.219 The New Jersey high court in Henderson came to the
same conclusion but then rejected the federal Manson test as inadequate
to safeguard due process for cases that do involve police suggestive-
ness.220 In contrast, the United States Supreme Court did not address the
issue of whether the Manson test provided adequate protection. The
Court faced the issue of identification reliability absent improper police
suggestion and simply found that Manson did not apply. Unfortunately,
the Court also rejected the notion of gatekeeping by the courts to assure
identification reliability. 221 This dicta in Perry directly conflicts with
Daubert,222 as well as Manson, which ostensibly calls for the exclusion of
identifications that are unduly suggestive and unreliable. 223
217. See supra notes 160, 212-14, and accompanying text. This preference for jury in-
structions is unfortunate in light of the research suggesting that expert witness testimony is
superior to jury instructions for apprising jurors about identification reliability factors. See
Michael Leippe, The Case for Expert Testimony About Eyewitness Memory, 1 PSYCHOL.
PUB. POL'Y & L. 909 (1995) (arguing for admission of expert testimony); see Christian
Sheehan, Note, Making the Jurors the "Experts": The Case for Eyewitness Identification
Jury Instructions, 52 B.C. L. REV. 651, 674 (2011) (acknowledging general view that expert
testimony is more effective than jury instructions).
218. See supra notes 145-49 and accompanying text.
219. Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716, 730 (2012).
220. Henderson, 27 A.3d at 924 ("we favor enhanced jury charges to help jurors per-
form" the ultimate task of evaluating identification reliability). Given the acknowledged
complexity of the many subjects and the difficulty jurors have in understanding them, it is
odd that the court embraces the cheap expedient of jury instructions as a generally suffi-
cient remedy.
221. The Court writes, "Our unwillingness to enlarge the domain of due process as
Perry and the dissent urge rests, in large part, on our recognition that the jury, not the
judge, traditionally determines the reliability of evidence." Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 728.
222. See supra notes 150-52 and accompanying text.
223. See Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 728.
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So what protections do apply to cases involving unreliability not caused
by state action? The Court wrote:
When no improper law enforcement activity is involved, we hold, it
suffices to test reliability through the rights and opportunities gener-
ally designed for that purpose, notably, the presence of counsel at
postindictment lineups, vigorous cross-examination, protective rules
of evidence, and jury instructions on both the fallibility of eyewitness
identification and the requirement that guilt be proved beyond a rea-
sonable doubt.224
In other words, the Court refused to change the status quo. In fact,
Justice Sotomayor complained in her dissenting opinion that the majority
ignored the "vast body of scientific literature" that confirmed "every con-
cern [about wrongful convictions] our precedents articulated nearly a
half-century ago." 225 At least for the time being, federal courts will con-
tinue to rely on the traditional safeguards that have failed to prevent
wrongful convictions. The "presence of counsel at postindictment line-
ups" is a right more imagined than real.226 Nor has vigorous cross-exami-
nation or the use of jury instructions proved particularly helpful in
preventing wrongful convictions.2 27
Interestingly, the Court also mentions "protective rules of evidence" as
an existing safeguard against unreliable identification evidence. 228 Per-
haps the Court meant to signal a need to apply the existing rules in a
more protective manner, or perhaps the word "protective" simply made
the majority feel better about denying any genuine reliability gatekeeping
under the due process clause. At the end of the day it seems clear: Either
the Federal Rules of Evidence must become more "protective," or
wrongful convictions based on misidentifications may continue
unabated.229
IV. CORRECTING COURSE: RELIABILITY GATEKEEPING
FOR EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION EVIDENCE
The recent decisions in New Jersey recognize that the rules of evidence
vest courts with gatekeeping authority for eyewitness identification evi-
224. Id. at 721 (emphasis added).
225. Id. at 738 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
226. Id. at 721 (majority opinion); see Thompson, Beyond a Reasonable Doubt?, supra
note 18, at 1509-11.
227. Thompson, Beyond a Reasonable Doubt?, supra note 18, at 1514-18 (addressing
ineffectiveness of jury instructions). Cross-examination has always been available as a trial
safeguard, but it has not prevented wrongful convictions, the vast majority obtained after
trial. See GARRETT, supra note 9, at 150 (only 6% of DNA exonerations involved convic-
tions by guilty plea [so 94% obtained after trial]).
228. Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 721.
229. In theory, reliability gatekeeping could also be conducted by police and prosecu-
tors. Rules of criminal procedure might also require better police procedures, thus mini-
mizing the incidence of law enforcement suggestion. See Thompson, What Price Justice?,




dence.2 30 In most cases, the gatekeeping consists of simply determining
whether proffered evidence meets the requirements of particular rules,
most of which were designed to promote outcome trustworthiness. In the
case of identification evidence, the only rule specifically on the subject
provides no genuine reliability assurance, 231 but other rules regulating the
admissibility of lay witness testimony also apply. As the previous sections
showed, the New Jersey Supreme Court relied on Rules 104, 402, 403,
602, and 701 to provide adequate support for extending reliability
gatekeeping to eyewitness identification evidence. In many ways, that
approach resembled that in Daubert.232 Moreover, as the Supreme Court
stated in Daubert, it is especially important for courts to screen evidence
for reliability when the type of evidence has a powerful effect on juries
and when it is hard to evaluate for reliability.233 Studies and numerous
DNA exonerations prove that jurors find identification evidence to be
convincing, even when such testimony is not reliable.234
Daubert and its progeny emerged during a period of perceived crisis in
the introduction of "junk science. '235 The requirement of evidentiary re-
liability flowed from one word in Rule 702-the requirement that the
testimony convey "knowledge." In Rule 702, viewed in conjunction with
the other rules pertaining to expert testimony, as well as Rules 403 and
104(a), the Court fashioned a gatekeeping process. The decision re-
sponded to the need for greater assurance of accuracy, during a time
when there were growing concerns about the proliferation of bad science
in toxic tort cases. The Court took it upon itself to spell out a gatekeep-
ing role where the language of the rules did not clearly do so. Only after
the Court had established the new parameters for gatekeeping in a series
of cases did the rule drafters step in to amend the rules. 236
230. See State v. Chen, 27 A.3d 930, 937 (N.J. 2011). The use of such hearings has also
been proposed for other police-generated lay witness testimony such as confessions that
result from custodial interrogations as well as police informant testimony. See Thompson,
Judicial Gatekeeping, supra note 18, at 48. Illinois provides for pretrial reliability screening
for informant testimony in capital cases and provides seven factors courts should take into
account. See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/115-21; see also NATAPOFF, supra note 18, at
192-94 (discussing Illinois statute on pretrial reliability hearings for informant testimony in
capital cases).
231. See infra notes 267-75 and accompanying text.
232. See supra notes 203-10 and accompanying text.
233. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
234. See BRIAN L. CUTLER & STEVEN D. PENROD, MISTAKEN IDENTIFICATION: THE
EYEWITNESS, PSYCHOLOGY, AND THE LAW 143-68, 171-209 (1995) (noting jurors' lack of
knowledge about factors affecting eyewitness identifications and jurors' inability to detect
unreliable identifications). Similar concerns have been made regarding jurors' abilities in
evaluating confessions and informant testimony. See LEO, supra note 18, at 266 (address-
ing the weight that jurors give to confession evidence and the "tunnel vision"-i.e., the
tendency to discount other inconsistent evidence-that it creates); NATAPOFF, supra note
18, at 77-78 (noting that jurors too often rely on false informant testimony and that one
psychological study showed that jurors disregard the fact that informants are compensated
for their testimony).
235. See supra note 130.
236. See supra notes 150-52 and accompanying text.
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For better or worse, similar judicial initiative is needed today, and as
with scientific evidence, court rulings will likely spur amendment of the
Rules. The innocence movement and hundreds of DNA exonerations
present an even more compelling need for courts to play a proactive role
in ensuring the integrity of the justice system.237 A few state legislatures
and some law enforcement agencies have made progress in improving the
quality of investigative practices, but the pace of progress is slow. 238 In
the meantime, cases continue to come before the courts with identifica-
tion evidence tainted by suggestive practices or other factors that suggest
the evidence is unreliable. Since in most jurisdictions police practices
have not changed,239 we can safely assume that the conditions that made
wrongful convictions possible in the past still exist unabated in most
places.
The recent decision of the United States Supreme Court in Perry v.
New Hampshire reaffirms that, at least according to current jurispru-
dence, due process provides no protection against unreliable identifica-
tions in the absence of police suggestiveness.2 40 Even in cases involving
police suggestiveness, the Manson test has proved ineffective and mis-
leading as a means of testing reliability.241 So what trial safeguards exist
for curbing this leading cause of wrongful convictions? The Court in
Perry was content to continue relying on the same traditional trial safe-
guards, ignoring the fact that hundreds of DNA exonerations prove that
the safeguards have not worked.242
Might some of these trial safeguards be improved? In Perry, the Court
spoke of the "protective rules of evidence," knowing full well that the
rules of evidence as presently applied provide no protection. 243 Perhaps
the Court meant to suggest that the rules of evidence have the potential
to become "protective" if so interpreted by the courts and revised by the
Advisory Committee.
The following sections provide a framework for interpreting the FRE
so as to provide protective gatekeeping for eyewitness identification testi-
mony. The subsequent sections address proposed amendments to the
Rules that would specifically define the gatekeeping function and en-
hance the safeguards against wrongful conviction.
237. See Thompson, Eyewitness Identifications, supra note 16, at 631-33. Judicial ethics
and the courts' supervisory authority to safeguard the integrity of the judicial system also
support judicial initiative in applying rules of evidence in a more protective manner. Id.
238. See Thompson, What Price Justice?, supra note 153, at 42-43.
239. Id.
240. Again, the same might be said with regard to confessions and informant testimony.
See supra note 18.
241. See Thompson, Eyewitness Identifications, supra note 16, at 608-21.
242. See Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716, 721 (2012) (emphasis added).
243. The Court was undoubtedly aware of the fact that the rules of evidence had not
prevented a great number of wrongful convictions. See, e.g., id. at 738 (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting) ("Eyewitness misidentification is the single greatest cause of wrongful convic-
tions in this country") (internal citations and quotation omitted).
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A. THE LESSONS OF DAUBERT AS APPLIED TO THE EVIDENCE RULES
ON THE ADMISSIBILITY OF LAY WITNESS TESTIMONY
The Supreme Court in Daubert found a "standard of evidentiary relia-
bility" in Rule 702's requirement that the testimony consist of "knowl-
edge. '244 The requirement that the testimony "assist the trier of fact"
further supported the standard of reliability "as a precondition to admis-
sibility. '245 In similar fashion, Rule 701 should create a standard of evi-
dentiary reliability for eyewitness identification evidence.2 46 The rule
requires the proponent of "opinion" testimony by a lay witness to estab-
lish that the testimony is "rationally based on the witness's perception"
and will be "helpful" to the jury.247 Without delving into the metaphysi-
cal question of how to differentiate "fact" from "opinion," 248 suffice it to
say that eyewitness identification testimony is clearly a judgment based
on a complex set of factors, and it can fairly be considered an opinion for
purposes of this rule. The New Jersey high court in Chen thought so. 249
Thus, the court found that the proponent of identification evidence
should show that it is "rationally based on ... perception. '2 50
If an erroneous identification is obtained through suggestive practices
by the police or a private actor, the erroneous identification will cause a
permanent distortion in the witness's memory of the culprit's face, result-
ing in testimony that cannot be said to be rationally based on the wit-
ness's actual perception of the culprit. Alternatively, if a witness views a
suspect under conditions in which it is highly unlikely that the identifica-
tion is reliable, the testimony cannot be said to be rationally based on
perception. This is true despite a witness's apparent confidence level,
which will be falsely inflated by confirmatory feedback or simply by the
nature of the pretrial process itself.251 For the same reasons, Rule 602 is
also applicable. Rule 602 requires courts to find sufficient evidence to
support a finding that a witness "has personal knowledge of the
matter. " 2
52
244. Daubert, 509 U.S. 579, 590 (1993); see also supra notes 132-40 and accompanying
text.
245. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591-92.
246. FED. R. EvID. 701 provides: "If a witness is not testifying as an expert, testimony in
the form of an opinion is limited to one that is: (a) rationally based on the witness's percep-
tion; (b) helpful to clearly understanding the witness's testimony or to determining a fact in
issue; and (c) not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge within the
scope of Rule 702."
247. Id.
248. See Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 163-64 (1988) (finding that the
term "factual finding" in Rule 803(8)(C) includes "conclusions or opinions that flow from a
factual investigation" and not simply "facts").
249. State v. Chen, 27 A.3d 930, 937 (N.J. 2011).
250. Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted).
251. See supra notes 185-88.
252. FED. R. EVID. 602. The court in Chen relied on both Rules 701 and 602 in outlin-
ing its gatekeeping role. Chen, 27 A.3d at 937. Resting the gatekeeping role on Rule 602
means that the courts would have to find that "no reasonable juror" could find that the
witness had personal knowledge of the culprit's identity. Presumably, the witness's testi-
mony would be found to be the product of police or private actor suggestion. Courts
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Hearing unreliable identification testimony will not be helpful to
the jury. Unreliable identification evidence will mislead the jury for
three important reasons. First, the witness will testify truthfully but mis-
takenly. 253 Second, the witness will have honest but falsely inflated
confidence in the accuracy of the identification, which may be due to con-
firmatory feedback as well as the nature of the pretrial process.2 54 This
inflated confidence will also cause distortions in the witness's assessment
of the events. 255 Third, jurors place great weight on witness confi-
dence.256 Moreover, especially when an innocent person is tried for a
crime based on a misidentification, prosecutors will typically, emphasize
sometimes conduct "taint" hearings pursuant to the due process clause or Rule 602 in cases
involving child witnesses to determine whether the child's testimony is the product of im-
proper suggestion or whether it is based on true memories of abuse. See Ashish S. Joshi,
Taint Hearing: Scientific and Legal Underpinnings, CHAMPION, Nov. 2010, at 36; but see
John E.B. Myers, Taint Hearings for Child Witnesses? A Step in the Wrong Direction, 46
BAYLOR L. REV. 873 (1994) (rejecting taint hearings as a matter of due process on grounds
that they would make convictions for child abuse difficult to obtain). In the case of confes-
sions, it makes more sense to rely on Rule 602, rather than Rule 701. It is harder to view
confessions as "opinions," and in every confession case challenging the reliability of the
confession, the defendant who disavows the reliability of his or her own statement provides
sufficient evidence that the statement is not the product of personal knowledge. See
Sharon L. Davies, The Reality of False Confessions-Lessons of the Central Park Jogger
Case, 30 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 209, 231-42 (2006) (arguing for a broader
gatekeeping role for confessions based on Rule 602 and reasoning by analogy to Daubert;
personal knowledge is called into question when defendant challenges the reliability of his
or her own incriminating statement).
253. Countless studies show that witnesses are honestly mistaken at high rates. See,
e.g., Gary L. Wells & Elizabeth A. Olsen, Eyewitness Testimony, 54 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL.
277, 291 (2003) (noting reports from two studies of actual cases of filler identification rates
of 20% and 24% and observing that these rates may be underestimated because police
often do not distinguish between witnesses who choose filler and those who make no
choice).
254. Witness confidence is profoundly increased by confirmatory feedback. See, e.g.,
Amy Bradfield Douglass & Nancy Steblay, Memory Distortion in Eyewitnesses: A Meta-
Analysis of the Post-identification Feedback Effect, 20 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 859
(2006) (meta-analysis confirms findings of dramatic distortions of witness confidence from
post-identification confirmatory feedback). However, witness confidence can be artificially
inflated by the confirmatory feedback of co-witnesses. See C.A. Elizabeth Luus & Gary L.
Wells, The Malleability of Eyewitness Confidence: Co-Witness and Perseverance Effects, 79
J. APPLIED PSYCH. 714, 720 (1994) ("Eyewitnesses who were led to believe that their co-
witness's identification corroborated their own were perceived to be more accurate, be
more persuasive, have had a better view, and give better descriptions of the thief than were
eyewitnesses who were led to believe that their co-witness's identification was in disagree-
ment."); John S. Shaw, III & Kimberley A. McClure, Repeated Postevent Questioning Can
Lead to Elevated Levels of Eyewitness Confidence, 20 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 629 (1996)
(finding that even simple nonmisleading post event questioning by police officers or during
pretrial preparation can elevate eyewitness confidence).
255. See supra note 254 and accompanying text.
256. See, e.g., Gary L. Wells et al., Accuracy, Confidence, and Juror Perceptions in Eye-
witness Identification, 64 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 440, 446 (1979) (finding that witness confi-
dence was unrelated to witness accuracy and that jurors' decisions to believe the witness
are highly related to their ratings of the witnesses' confidence); Gary Wells & Michael R.
Leippe, How Do Triers of Fact Infer the Accuracy of Eyewitness Identifications? Using
Memory for Peripheral Detail Can Be Misleading, 66 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 682, 686 (1981)
(demonstrating that jurors incorrectly assessed accuracy of witnesses' identification of
criminal based on witnesses' ability to correctly describe peripheral trivia); see also State v.
Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 910 (N.J. 2011).
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in jury statements the importance of eyewitness testimony and its suffi-
ciency for alone proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 257 Indeed, in
Brandon Garrett's study of 250 DNA exonerations, prosecutors were also
found to emphasize eyewitness certainty,2 58 a scientifically invalid indica-
tor of accuracy in most cases.259
Like the expert opinion addressed in Daubert, the admissibility of lay
opinion testimony under Rule 701 is a question of admissibility for the
trial courts under Rule 104(a).260 As such, as with Rule 702, the propo-
nent of the evidence must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that
the opinion is supported by an adequate basis in fact.261 The witness's
opinion must be based on first-hand knowledge so as to support the relia-
bility of the inference.2 62
In applying this standard of evidentiary reliability, courts will find it
useful to establish a set of factors that have a bearing on reliability. The
Court in Daubert outlined a number of criteria for judging scientific relia-
bility.263 The New Jersey Supreme Court also addressed numerous sys-
tem and estimator variables, as well as suggestion by private actors, for
lower courts to consider in judging reliability. 264
The Court in Daubert also urged trial judges to "be mindful of other
applicable rules. 265 The only rule that specifically addresses the admissi-
bility of identification evidence is Rule 801(d)(1)(C), which traditionally
has admitted statements of identification without any reliability screen-
ing.266 Rule 801(d)(1)(C) permits testimony by a declarant who "identi-
fies a person as someone the declarant perceived earlier. ' 267 The rule
257. See GARRETT, supra note 9, at 5, 79-80 (2011) (discussing how misidentifications
played a central role in wrongful convictions in which defendants were later exonerated by
DNA).
258. Id. at 79.
259. See supra note 256.
260. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592 (1993).
261. Id. at 592 n.10.
262. See FED. R. EVID. 701 advisory committee's notes to the 2000 amendment (opin-
ion must be "based upon a layperson's personal knowledge").
263. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-95.
264. State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 920-22 (N.J. 2011).
265. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595. The Court identified Rules 703 and 706 as two additional
rules specifically pertaining to expert witnesses that might provide some guidance to lower
courts in assessing the reliability of scientific evidence. Id.
266. Rule 801(d)(1)(C) designates statements of identification as "not hearsay" despite
the fact that they meet the definition of hearsay. See FED. R. EviD. 801(d)(1)(C). As such,
they are exempt from the rule making hearsay inadmissible. See FED. R. EVID. 802.
I have previously voiced similar concerns about incriminating statements made during cus-
todial interrogations that are freely admitted under FRE 801(d)(2)(A). This rule admits
the out-of-court statements of an opposing party without any reliability gatekeeping. Pros-
ecutors traditionally rely on the rule to admit the incriminating statements of criminal de-
fendants such as confessions made during custodial interrogation or incriminating
statements ostensibly made to a jailhouse informant. See Thompson, Judicial Gatekeeping,
supra note 18, at 46.
267. Rule 801(d)(1) states:
A Declarant-Witness's Prior Statement. The declarant testifies and is subject
to cross-examination about a prior statement, and the statement:
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requires only that the "declarant testifies and is subject to cross-examina-
tion about [the] prior statement. '268 This has meant that eyewitness iden-
tification testimony has been freely admitted with only the additional
protections of the anemic due process test. The rule, drafted in 1975,
predates the innocence movement and the steady stream of DNA exoner-
ations that have raised awareness about reliability concerns.269 It also
predates the development of less suggestive protocols for law
enforcement. 270
Nonetheless, the Advisory Committee's notes indicate that reliability
motivated the drafting of the rule. While Rule 801(d)(1)(C) takes as a
given that eyewitnesses will be allowed to identify the alleged perpetra-
tors of crimes in court, it views the choice as between a highly suggestive
in-court identification and an earlier out-of-court identification.271 The
Advisory Committe assumed that the out-of-court identification will be
obtained under less suggestive circumstances. 272 The notes state: "The
basis [of the rule] is the generally unsatisfactory and inconclusive nature
of courtroom identifications as compared with those made at an earlier
time under less suggestive conditions. '2 73 Thus, it is consistent with a
reading of the rules that the drafters favored out-of-court identifications
on the assumption that the identifications would be conducted under
less suggestive circumstances than a highly suggestive in-court
identification.2 74
In light of modern awareness of the factors that reduce identification
reliability and the development of best practices for the police, it would
be within a court's discretion to read Rule 801(d)(1)(C) as advocating
that the least suggestive means be used by law enforcement. Indeed,
given the drafters' concern for admitting the most reliable identifications,
courts would be well advised to take into account other factors besides
police suggestiveness in determining whether the identification evidence
is sufficiently reliable to be admitted. 275
Rule 403 was the last applicable rule discussed in Daubert.276 The
Court cited Rule 403 only for the proposition that the rules authorize
gatekeeping to prevent juries from hearing evidence that has a tendency
(C) identifies a person as someone the declarant perceived earlier.
FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1).
268. Id.
269. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
270. See Thompson, What Price Justice supra note 153, at 42-43.
271. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(C) advisory committee's note.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. See Brandon L. Garrett, Eyewitnesses and Exclusion, 65 VAND. L. REV. (forthcom-
ing 2012) (manuscript at 457) (on file with author) (arguing that in-court identifications
should be per se excluded if there is a prior out-of-court identification and any flaws with
out-of-court identifications explained to the jury).
275. Cf. State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 920-921 (N.J. 2011) (providing a non-exhaus-
tive list of "estimator variables" or factors pertaining to the eyewitness's inherent reliabil-
ity independent of any effects caused by law enforcement or the legal system).
276. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 595 (1993).
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to be misleading. Expert evidence, being both powerful and difficult to
evaluate, has the potential to mislead juries and lead to unreliable ver-
dicts.277 The same argument applies with equal force to identification tes-
timony. Jurors find eyewitness identification testimony to be powerful,
and they have difficulty evaluating its reliability. 278
Two points warrant emphasizing in light of the extremely high and un-
precedented nature of the burden placed on defendants in Henderson
and Chen. The New Jersey cases imposed on defendants the requirement
of proving a "very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentifica-
tion. ' 279 In effect, the court required defendants to prove that it is practi-
cally certain that the eyewitness is wrong. The burden of proving the
admissibility of identification evidence under Rule 701 should rest with
the proponent-the prosecutor-who must prove reliability by a prepon-
derance. Gatekeeping implies a determination of whether to allow evi-
dence to pass through the gate. The New Jersey approach instead
assumed the evidence will come in as usual and then made it almost im-
possible for defendants to toss it back out. Even Rule 403 does not re-
quire the opponent of otherwise admissible evidence to prove the
evidence is almost certainly wrong, only that the risk of unfair prejudice
or misleading the jury substantially outweighs its probative value.280
Moreover, Daubert did not apply Rule 403 in interpreting Rule 702-it
was applying Rule 702. Courts should similarly apply Rule 701 with the
same assessment of burdens as applied in Daubert to Rule 702.
B. AMENDING THE EVIDENCE RULES FOR IDENTIFICATION EVIDENCE
TO MAKE THE RELIABILITY REQUIREMENT EXPLICIT
Full-blown, individualized reliability screening represents a dramatic
departure from past practices. Without specific guidance in the rules,
courts will need to draw upon the language of existing rules in defining a
reliability gatekeeping role. In time, the rules will warrant re-examina-
tion so that they may be amended to provide explicit protections against
identification evidence that is so unreliable as to put innocent defendants
in jeopardy. The following are a few modest proposals intended to begin
a dialogue on rules revision.281
277. See id. at 595 & n.10.
278. See id. at 595.
279. State v. Henderson, 208, 289 (N.J. 2011); see State v. Chen, 27 A.3d 930, 943 (N.J.
2011); see also supra notes 189-91 and accompanying text.
280. Rule 403 provides: "The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value
is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice,
confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly present-
ing cumulative evidence." FED. R. EVID. 403.
281. The pattern jury instructions might also be amended to give explicit guidance to
trial courts on scientifically-based jury instructions and the circumstances in which they
should be given. Several state high courts have adopted rules requiring jury instructions on
eyewitness identification issues under certain circumstances. The Connecticut Supreme
Court established a mandatory jury instruction advising jurors in the event that the police
fail to follow proper procedures when obtaining identification testimony. State v. Ledbet-
ter, 881 A.2d 290, 316 (Conn. 2005). The New Jersey Supreme Court required a specific
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1. Revising Rule 801(d)(2)(C) to Better Ensure Reliability of
Identification Evidence
Amending the hearsay rule represents the most effective way to bring
about a new approach to admitting identification testimony. The provi-
sion could be amended to incorporate reliability gatekeeping in much the
same way that Rule 702 was amended after Daubert.282 Rule 702 now
explicitly calls for reliability screening for expert scientific testimony.283
Among other things, it requires courts to determine whether expert testi-
mony is the "product of reliable principles and methods" and that the
expert "has applied these principles and methods reliably to the facts of
the case. '284 In like manner, Rule 801(d)(1)(C) can be amended as
follows:
(d) Statements That Are Not Hearsay. A statement that meets the
following conditions is not hearsay:
(1) A Declarant-Witness's Prior Statement. The declarant testifies
and is subject to cross-examination about a prior statement, and the
statement:
(C) identifies a person as someone the declarant perceived earlier.
In a criminal case, the statement must be: (1) obtained through
methods that provide circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness; (2)
the declarant must have been capable of reliably perceiving the person
under the circumstances at the earlier time; and (3) the declarant must
have been capable of reliably identifying the person at the time the
statement was made.28 5
A simple change such as this can officially usher in a new approach to
admitting critical prosecution evidence. 286 It would require an evaluation
instruction sensitizing jurors to the effects of cross-racial identification in cases in which the
identification plays a central role and there is no corroborating evidence. State v.
Cromedy, 727 A.2d 457, 461-67 (N.J. 1999). As noted above, the same court in Henderson
recently authorized such instructions to be given during trial before the eyewitness testi-
fies. See Henderson, 27 A.3d at 916; see also supra note 214 and accompanying text. The
Georgia Supreme Court has directed lower courts in the state to refrain from giving a jury
instruction advising jurors to take into account witness certainty in evaluating identifica-
tion reliability. Brodes v. State, 614 S.E.2d 766, 769 (Ga. 2005). While witness certainty
was once thought to indicate identification accuracy, studies have now shown that witness
certainty at trial does not indicate accuracy.
282. See FED. R. EvID. 702 advisory committee's note; see also supra notes 151-52 and
accompanying text.
283. FED. R. EvID. 702.
284. Id.
285. A similar change could also be applied to admissions obtained by law enforcement
for use in criminal cases to incorporate reliability screening for confessions and jailbouse
informants. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
286. For a similar argument in the context of the admissibility of child witness hearsay
testimony, see Jean Montoya, Something Not So Funny Happened on the Way to Convic-
tion: The Pretrial Interrogation of Child Witnesses, 35 ARIz. L. REV. 927, 984-85 (1993)
(arguing for hearsay legislation to implement a trustworthiness inquiry prior to the admis-
sion of all children's out-of-court statements, providing courts with guidance by enumerat-
ing factors pertinent to trustworthiness of children's hearsay).
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of the system variables and other possible private actor suggestiveness
variables that can taint an identification process. 287 The rule would also
take into account the characteristics of the witness (so-called "estimator
variables") that affect reliability, both at the time of the crime and when
making the identification.2 88
2. Revising Rule 104(c) to Require Hearings Outside the Presence of
the Jury
Rule 104(c) requires that hearings be held outside the presence of the
jury under three circumstances: (1) if the hearing involves the admissibil-
ity of a confession; (2) when the defendant testifies and so requests; and
(3) if justice so requires.2 89 Traditionally, trial courts already conduct
pretrial hearings on the constitutionality of eyewitness identification evi-
dence, so adding a hearing on evidentiary grounds imposes no additional
burden on the courts as compared to conducting the hearing during trial.
Indeed, because of the highly persuasive nature of identification testi-
mony, jurors should not be permitted to hear the testimony before the
court has conducted adequate reliability gatekeeping.
As currently written, Rule 104(c) applies specifically to a defendant's
out-of-court confession or in-court testimony. 290 The rule merely puts
into effect the constitutional rule set forth in Jackson v. Denno.291 In
addition, the rule recognizes that there may be other situations in which
evidentiary hearings should be held outside the presence of the jury.
Thus, courts have the discretion to hold such hearings when "justice so
requires. '292 This provision clearly extends judicial discretion to prevent
jurors from hearing other evidence whose prejudicial potential parallels
the powerful effect of a confession.
The powerful nature of identification evidence justifies treatment simi-
lar to that for confessions under 104(c). The rule should be amended to
create a new subsection (3), making the current subsection (3) into a new
subsection (4). The amended rule would read:
(c) Conducting a Hearing So That the Jury Cannot Hear It. The
court must conduct any hearing on a preliminary question so that the
jury cannot hear it if:
287. See supra notes 180-82 & 187 and accompanying text; see also State v. Chen, 27
A.3d 930, 942-43 (N.J. 2011).
288. See supra notes 182-83 and accompanying text.
289. Rule 104(c) states: "The court must conduct any hearing on a preliminary question
so that the jury cannot hear it if: (1) the hearing involves the admissibility of a confession;
(2) a defendant in a criminal case is a witness and so requests; or (3) justice so requires."
FED. R. EviD. 104(c).
290. FED. R. EVID. 104(c) (requiring a hearing so that the jury cannot hear it if "(1) the
hearing involves the admissibility of a confession; (2) a defendant in a criminal case is a
witness and so requests").
291. See FED. R. OF EVID. 104(c) advisory committee's note (citing Jackson v. Denno,
378 U.S. 368 (1964)).
292. FED. R. EVID. 104(c)(3).
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(3) the hearing involves the admissibility of a statement of identifi-
cation and a defendant in a criminal case so requests; or 2 9 3
(4) justice so requires.
As this rule is not constitutionally required, it is in keeping with the ad-
versary process to require defense counsel to request the exclusion of the
jury from a hearing on identification admissibility.
This amendment to Rule 104(c) is further supported by the reasoning
underlying Rule 103(d), which states that "[t]o the extent practicable, the
court must conduct a jury trial so that inadmissible evidence is not sug-
gested to the jury by any means. ' 294 This rule is premised "on the suppo-
sition that a ruling which excludes evidence in a jury case is likely to be a
pointless procedure if the excluded evidence nevertheless comes to the
attention of the jury."' 295 The Advisory Committee cites Bruton v. United
States, in which the Supreme Court rejected the palliative of jury instruc-
tions as a cure for the admission of the defendant's own incriminating
statements offered through the confession of a co-defendant.2 96 In
Bruton, the Court explained the futility of jury instructions in removing
the effect of a confession from the jurors' minds:
The fact of the matter is that too often such admonition against
misuse is intrinsically ineffective in that the effect of such a
nonadmissible declaration cannot be wiped from the brains of the
jurors. The admonition therefore becomes a futile collocation of
words and fails of its purpose as a legal protection to defendants
against whom such a declaration should not tell. . . .The Govern-
ment should not have the windfall of having the jury be influenced
by evidence against a defendant which, as a matter of law, they
should not consider but which they cannot put out of their minds.
2 97
In like fashion, a pivotal moment in a trial comes when eyewitnesses
tell the jury that they identified the defendant as the person who commit-
ted the crime. Countless studies confirm that jurors tend to believe eye-
witness identification testimony, especially when it is stated with high
confidence by a witness.298 The likelihood of misuse of unreliable identi-
fication evidence justifies measures to protect against the jury hearing the
evidence before it is determined to be admissible. Considering Rules 103
and 104 in combination, courts clearly have the discretion-and arguably
commit error to refuse-to hold pretrial hearings on the reliability of eye-
witness identification evidence, just as they must for confessions. To pro-
vide more explicit guidance for trial courts, Rule 104(c) could be
293. The current subsection (3) that provides for hearings outside the jury's hearing
when "justice so requires" would be retained as a new subsection (4). Id.
294. FED. R. EVID. 103(d).
295. FED. R. EVID. 103(c) advisory committee's note (citing Bruton v. United States,
389 U.S. 123 (1968)).
296. Id. (citing Bruton, 391 U.S. at 123).
297. Bruton, 391 U.S. at 129 (quoting Delli Paoli v. United States, 352 U.S. 232, 247-48
(1957)).
298. See supra note 256 and accompanying text; see also State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d
872, 910-11 (N.J. 2011).
2012]
SMU LAW REVIEW
amended to require a hearing outside the hearing of the jury to deter-
mine the admissibility of eyewitness identification testimony.
3. Revising Rule 702 to Require Certain Expert Testimony on
Eyewitness Identifications
Judicial practices on the admission of expert testimony have begun to
shift. In the past, courts typically denied proffered defense experts on
identification reliability factors. Increasingly, however, trial courts have
gained awareness of the importance of expert testimony. In fact, a num-
ber of states have interpreted their state counterparts to Rule 702 to man-
date the admission of expert testimony under certain circumstances. In
Utah and Tennessee, for example, the high courts essentially mandated
the admission of expert testimony in cases in which the eyewitness identi-
fies a stranger and one or more reliability factors is present.299 The Ten-
nessee court rejected the trial court's finding that direct and cross-
examination sufficed to inform the jury about reliability concerns, noting
that "[t]imes have changed. '300 The Texas high court found it to be an
abuse of discretion to exclude reliable and relevant expert testimony that
would have assisted the jury in understanding the eyewitness's testi-
mony.30 1 Other states have taken a more restrictive approach and only
require the admission of expert testimony when identification is the criti-
cal evidence in the government's case and there is no corroborating evi-
dence.302 State courts are much less likely to state that the factors
affecting eyewitness reliability are within the common experience of the
jury as they once did.303
Given the importance of the issue, it may be appropriate to consider a
revision to Rule 702 to specify the appropriateness of expert testimony on
eyewitness identification. The rules should, at a minimum, adopt the re-
strictive rule for criminal cases. Rule 702 would be divided into two main
parts, with the second part being a new section pertaining to eyewitness
identifications in criminal cases:
Rule 702. Testimony by Expert Witnesses
(1) A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an opin-
ion or otherwise...
299. See State v. Clopten, 223 P.3d 1103, 1112 (Utah 2009); State v. Copeland, 226
S.W.3d 287, 301 (Tenn. 2007).
300. Copeland, 226 S.W.3d at 299.
301. See Tillman v. State, 354 S.W.3d 425, 442 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011).
302. See State v. Wright, 206 P.3d 856, 864 (Idaho Ct. App. 2009); People v. McDonald,
690 P.2d 709, 727 (Cal. 1984); cf. Manley v. State, 672 S.E.2d 654, 660 (Ga. 2009) (uphold-
ing exclusion of identification expert because adequate corroborating evidence existed);
State v. Buell, 489 N.E.2d 795, 804 (Ohio 1986).
303. See State v. Chapple, 660 P.2d 1208, 1220-21 (Ariz. 1983) (finding an abuse of
discretion when trial court's exclusionary rule was based on a determination that the testi-
mony was within the common experience of the jury); Commonwealth v. Christie, 98
S.W.2d 485, 490 (Ky. 2002).
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(2) In criminal cases, a witness who is qualified as an expert on a
relevant issue affecting the reliability of an eyewitness's identification
shall be permitted to testify if the identification is critical to the govern-
ment's proof and there exists no substantial corroborating evidence.
State courts may choose to take an even more liberal approach to ad-
missibility, as in Utah and Tennessee. One potential problem with the
corroboration requirement in the restrictive approach proposed here is
that courts may rely on the existence of multiple eyewitnesses as corrobo-
ration, when in fact all of the eyewitnesses may have been subject to the
same suggestive practices or other factors that result in multiple misiden-
tifications.30 4 Moreover, a false identification at the beginning of an in-
vestigation can cause investigators to develop "tunnel vision," a
confirmatory bias that may lead to the gathering of other false evi-
dence.30 5 At least for the time being, there would be some benefit in a
rule that makes it an abuse of discretion to exclude expert testimony on
eyewitness reliability-regardless of the showing of relevance and neces-
sity made by the defense. It is simply too late in the day to continue
sanctioning the blanket rejection of expert testimony as not helpful to the
jury because eyewitness identification involves a "credibility determina-
tion within the ken of the ordinary judge and juror. '30 6 A great many
state courts and federal circuits have moved in the direction of admitting
expert testimony already, so the rule would simply move the rest of the
courts in the same direction.
V. CONCLUSION
In December of 1995, Juan Smith was convicted of first-degree murder
in New Orleans, Louisiana, on the basis of the sole testimony of Larry
Boatner.30 7 No other physical evidence connected Smith to the crime.30 8
On January 10, 2012, over fifteen years later, the United States Supreme
304. See GARRETr, supra note 9, at 50 (In a study of 250 DNA exoneration cases, "36%
[of those that included a misidentification] (68 of 190 exonerees) were identified by multi-
ple eyewitnesses, some by as many as three or four or five.").
305. See Keith A. Findley & Michael S. Scott, The Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel Vi-
sion in Criminal Cases, 2006 Wis. L. REv. 291, 292 (defining tunnel vision as the "compen-
dium of common heuristics and logical fallicies, to which we are all susceptible, that lead
actors in the criminal justice system to focus on a suspect, select and filter the evidence that
will build a case for conviction, while ignoring or suppressing evidence that points away
from guilt.") (internal citations and quotations omitted). Studies find that wrongful convic-
tions often include more than one type of false evidence. See, e.g., Know the Cases: Ken-
neth Adams, INNOCENCE PROJECr, http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/Kenneth-
Adams.php (last visited May 9, 2012) (discussing a wrongful conviction caused by eyewit-
ness misidentification, false confessions/admissions, and unvalidated or improper forensic
science); Know the Cases: George Rodriguez, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocence
project.org/Content/George-Rodriguez.php (last visited May 9, 2012) (discussing a wrong-
ful conviction caused by eyewitness misidentification and invalidated or improper forensic
science); Know the Causes: Josiah Sutton, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocencepro-
ject.org/Content/Josiah_- Sutton.php (last visited May 9, 2012).
306. United States v. Brien, 59 F.3d 274, 276 (1st Cir. 1995); see also United States v.
Kime, 99 F.3d 870, 884 (8th Cir. 1996).
307. Smith v. Cain, 132 S. Ct. 627, 629-30 (2012).
308. Id. at 630.
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Court reversed the conviction in an 8-1 decision.30 9 It turns out that the
eyewitness had repeatedly told the police that he had not seen the faces
of the gunmen and could not identify them if he saw them.310 However,
this information was not turned over to the defense. It surfaced years
later during post-conviction proceedings when the defense found it in po-
lice files.311 While the Smith case turned on a violation of the disclosure
rules in Brady v. Maryland,312 the case nonetheless underscores yet again
(like so many DNA exonerations based on misidentifications) the perils
of leaving it to jurors to determine the reliability of eyewitness identifica-
tion testimony, especially in the absence of corroborating evidence. 313
The hearsay rules normally protect against the admission of unreliable
out-of-court statements. In the case of statements of identification, the
drafters of the FRE thought Rule 801(d)(1)(C) provided adequate mea-
sures of reliability in the presence of the declarant as a witness who could
be cross-examined and the use of "less suggestive" procedures (than an
in-court identification) in obtaining out-of-court identifications. Unfortu-
nately, experience shows that this regime of automatic admission of an
eyewitness's identification testimony without affirmative proof of reliabil-
ity causes systemic failure. Courts should take the reliability paradigm of
the Federal Rules of Evidence seriously and read the rules in the holistic
manner adopted by the Supreme Court in Daubert. The trial court's
gatekeeping authority exists in Rules 104(a), 701, 602, and 403, not to
mention in the reliability aims of Rule 801(d)(1)(C).
The dangers of wrongful conviction persist. Exoneration cases re-
present the "tip of the iceberg," and misidentifications put more innocent
people behind bars and on death row than any other type of error.314
Due process will not provide protection, and neither will other trial safe-
guards such as the presence of counsel or cross-examination. As was true
with scientific evidence in Daubert, identification evidence has a powerful
effect on jurors, and jurors cannot accurately assess its reliability. Trial
courts are the final backstop. Judges can receive training to develop the
expertise necessary to evaluate eyewitness reliability, and they can hear
from experts as well. The rules of evidence put them in charge of mind-
ing the gate. The very purpose of the rules is that evidentiary decisions
should "promote the development of evidence law, to the end of ascer-
taining the truth and securing a just determination. '315 Judicial leader-
ship in promoting criminal trial reliability in this manner will pave the
way for amendments to the rules that will more explicitly delineate ad-
missibility criteria and proper procedure.
309. Id. at 631.
310. Id. at 629-30.
311. Id.
312. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
313. See generally Thompson, Beyond a Reasonable Doubt, supra note 18, at 1540-43
(arguing for a corroborating evidence requirement for eyewitness identification
testimony).
314. Id. at 1491-93.
315. FED. R. EVID. 102.
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APPENDIX
THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE AND THEIR
RESPECTIVE PURPOSES
Sandra Guerra Thompson
Rule # Title Purpose(s)
101 Scope; Definitions [Procedural]
Purpose Reliability & Judicial
Efficiency
103 Rulings on Evidence Reliability &
[Procedural]
104 Preliminary Questions Reliability & [Procedural]
105 Limiting Evidence That Is Not Admissible Against Reliability & [Procedural]
Other Parties or for Other Purposes
106 Reminder of or Related Writings or Recorded Reliability & Advocacy
Statements System
201 Judicial Notice of Adjudicative Facts Reliability & Judicial
I _Efficiency
301 Presumptions in Civil Cases Generally Reliability, Societal Goals,
& [Procedural]
302 Applying State Law to Presumptions in Civil Cases Societal Goals &
[Procedural]
401 Test for Relevant Evidence Reliability
402 General Admissibility of Relevant Evidence Reliability
403 Excluding Relevant Evidence for Prejudice, Reliability & Judicial
Confusion, Waste of Time, or Other Reasons Efficiency
404 Character Evidence, Crimes or Other Acts Reliability & Advocacy
System
405 Methods of Proving Character Reliability & [Procedural]
406 Habit; Routine Practice Reliability
407 Subsequent Remedial Measures Reliability, Societal Goals,
& Advocacy System
408 Compromise Offers and Negotiations Reliability, Societal Goals,
& Advocacy System
409 Offers to Pay Medical and Similar Expenses Reliability & Societal
Goals
410 Pleas, Plea Discussions, and Related Statements Reliability, Societal Goals,
& Advocacy System
411 Liability Insurance Reliability & Societal
Goals
412 Sex Offense Cases: The Victim's Sexual Behavior or Reliability & Societal
Predisposition Goals
413 Similar Crimes in Sexual Assault Cases Reliability & Societal
Goals
414 Similar Crimes in Child-Molestation Cases Reliability & Societal
Goals
415 Similar Acts in Civil Cases Involving Sexual Assault Reliability & Societal
or Child Molestation Goals
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501 Privilege in General* Societal Goals
502 Attorney-Client Privilege and Work Product; Societal Goals &
Limitations on Waiver Advocacy System
601 Competency to Testify in General Reliability
602 Need for Personal Knowledge Reliability
603 Oath or Affirmation to Testify Truthfully Reliability
604 Interpreter Reliability
605 Judge's Competency as a Witness Reliability
606 Juror's Competency as a Witness Reliability
607 Who May Impeach a Witness Reliability
608 A Witness's Character for Truthfulness or Reliability
Untruthfulness
609 Impeachment by Evidence of Criminal Conviction Reliability
610 Religious Beliefs or Opinions Reliability & Societal
Goals
611 Mode and Order of Examining Witnesses and Reliability & [Procedural]
Presenting Evidence
612 Writing Used to Refresh a Witness's Memory Reliability
613 Witness's Prior Statement Reliability & [Procedural]
614 Court's Calling or Examining a Witness Reliability & [Procedural]
615 Excluding Witnesses Reliability
701 Opinion Testimony by Lay Witnesses Reliability
702 Testimony by Expert Witnesses Reliability
703 Bases of an Expert's Opinion Testimony Reliability
704 Opinion on an Ultimate Issue Reliability
705 Disclosing the Facts or Data Underlying an Expert's Reliability
Opinion
706 Court-Appointed Expert Witnesses Reliability
801 Definitions that Apply to [the Hearsay] Article; Reliability & Advocacy
Exclusions from Hearsay System
802 The Rule Against Hearsay Rule Reliability
803 Exceptions to the Rule Against Hearsay- Reliability
Regardless of Whether the Declarant Is Unavailable
as a Witness
804 Exceptions to the Rule Against Hearsay-When the Reliability
Declarant Is Unavailable as a Witness
805 Hearsay Within Hearsay Reliability
806 Attacking and Supporting the Declarant's Reliability
Credibility
807 Residual Exception Reliability
901 Authenticating or Identifying Evidence Reliability
902 Evidence That Is Self-Authenticating Reliability
903 Subscribing Witness's Testimony Reliability & [Procedural]
1001 Definitions That Apply to This [The Best Evidence [Definitions]
Rule] Article
1002 Requirement of the Original Reliability
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1003 Admissibility of Duplicates Reliability
1004 Admissibility of Other Evidence of Content Reliability
1005 Copies of Public Records to Prove Content Reliability
1006 Summaries to Prove Content Reliability
1007 Testimony or Statement of a Party to Prove Content Reliability
1008 Functions of the Court and Jury [Procedural]
1101 Applicability of the Rules [Procedural]
1102 Amendments [Procedural]
1103 Title [Procedural]
* The attorney-client privilege also advances the reliability of the trial process by facilitating
effective legal representation. To what extent effective legal representation furthers the search
for truth is hard to say except that it can help a client avoid an unjust outcome.
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